14 42. The Commission did not present specific considerations in relation to this issue. b) Decision of the Court 43. It is the jurisprudence of the Court that the alleged victims, their family members, or representatives in the contentious proceedings before this Court, may invoke the violation of rights different than those included in the Commission’s application, so long as they refer to facts already included in the application,28 which constitutes the factual framework of the proceeding.29 In turn, the alleged victims or their representatives may refer to facts that explain, contextualize, clarify, or reject those mentioned in the application or even respond to the claims of the State,30 depending on their arguments and the evidence they provide. The purpose of this possibility is to make effective the procedural power of locus standi in judicio that is recognized in the Rules of Procedure of the Tribunal, without this invalidating the conventional limitations to their participation and the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction, nor being an infringement or violation of the State’s right to a defense,31 since the latter has the procedural opportunities to respond to the arguments of the Commission and the representatives during each stage of the process. Furthermore, supervening facts may be submitted to the Court at any stage of the proceeding before the judgment is issued.32 Finally, it is the responsibility of the Court to decide in each case the admissibility of arguments of that nature in protection of the procedural balance of the parties.33 44. In light of the criteria put forward, it is up to the Tribunal to determine whether the facts alleged within the factual framework established by the Commission in its application must be classified as acts of torture. 45. The Tribunal notes that in the Report on Admissibility N° 95/06, the InterAmerican Commission considered that in the case of Mr. Vélez Loor the alleged torture facts described in the petition and the lack of information about criminal investigations and penalties relating to these facts constitute a possible violation of Articles 5, 8, and 25 of the American Convention and Articles 1, 6, and 8 of the Convention against Torture.34 Then, when assessing the facts brought before it as possible acts of torture, the Commission deemed, in the Report on the Merits N° 37/09 adopted in this case, that it did not have “sufficient evidence that Mr. Vélez 28 Cf. Case of the “Five Pensioners” v. Perú. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of February 28, 2003. Series C No. 98, para. 155; Case of Ibsen Cárdenas and Ibsen Peña v. Bolivia. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 1, 2010. Series C No. 217, para. 228, and Case of The Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010. Series C No. 214, para. 237. 29 Cf. Case of the “Mapiripan Massacre” v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 15, 2005. Series C No. 134, para. 59; Case of The Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community, supra note 28, para. 237, and Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, supra note 11, para. 49. 30 Cf. Case of the “Five Pensioners”, supra note 28, para. 153; Case of The Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community, supra note 28, para. 237, and Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, supra note 11, para. 49. 31 Cf. Case of Perozo et al., supra note 9, para. 32, and Case of Reverón Trujillo, supra note 17, para. 135. 32 Cf. Case of the “Five Pensioners”, supra note 28, para. 154; Case of The Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community, supra note 28, para. 237, and Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, supra note 11, para. 49. 33 Cf. Case of the “Mapiripan Massacre”, supra note 29, para. 58; Case of The Dos Erres Massacre, supra note 27, para. 165, and Case of Reverón Trujillo, supra note 17, para. 135. 34 Cf. Report N° 95/06 (Admissibility), Petition 92/04, Jesús Tranquilino Vélez – Panama, Loor, issued by the Inter-American Commission on October 21, 2006 (case file of the evidence, tome I, appendix 2 to the application, folio 50).