26 them and the object of the present case, bearing in mind the observations of the parties. 82. The statement of the alleged victim is useful insofar as it can provide additional information on the violations and their consequences.58 However, because it has a direct interest in this case, such statement will be assessed together with all the evidence in the proceedings.59 83. The Court notes that the representatives and the State presented their observations to the affidavits on August 24, 2010. Moreover, on that same date, the Commission stated that it did not have observations to submit regarding the sworn statements forwarded. 84. As to the testimony of Mrs. Sharon Irasema Diaz, the State pointed out that “apart from referring to the facts that she has personal knowledge of and the facts she has knowledge of because of her functions, the statement so rendered contains a series of opinions and considerations that, rather than a testimony, would constitute an expert opinion given that it refers to opinions derived from the special knowledge or expertise of the deponent.” 85. For their part, the representatives pointed out that “when assessing the statements of witnesses Carlos Benigno González Gómez, Alfredo Castillero Hoyos, and Roxana Méndez, [the Court] must take into account that they are public officials.” In addition, they indicated that the statement of witness Luis Adolfo Corró Fernández “is not related to the facts established in the application and [...] does not provide relevant elements for the determination or scope of the measures of reparation that the Court shall [...] eventually order, on the grounds that it refers to different initiatives to reform the immigration law, which, in most cases, have not been approved and therefore are not part of the Panamanian legal system.” As to the statement of witness Alfredo Castillero Hoyos, they noted that, "most of the matters narrated by the witness are not related to any of the facts of the case, both as to the violations committed and to the aspects that could be brought before the Tribunal regarding the scope of the reparations that should be ordered.” Moreover, they indicated that witness Carlos Benigno González Gómez made statements that exceeded the purpose defined, “when he referred not only to the deportation process of Mr. Vélez Loor in the January, 2002, but also to proceedings conducted by the Ecuadorian Consulate in Panama, when he had to only declare about the alleged notification proceedings conducted.” Finally, in relation to the declaration of witness Roxana Méndez de Obarrio, they pointed out that such declaration “is not related to the detention conditions of the centers at which Mr. Vélez Loor was confined.” 86. In this respect, the Court takes note of the objections and observations presented by the State and the representatives; however, this Tribunal considers that such arguments relate to a matter of evidentiary weight and not of admissibility of the evidence.60 As a consequence, the Court admits the statements mentioned, without prejudice to the fact that its evidentiary value may only be considered regarding the matters that fit with the purpose timely defined by the President of the Court (supra para. 8), taking into account the body of evidence, the observations of the parties and the rules of sound judgment. 58 Cf. Case of the “White Van” (Paniagua Morales et al.), supra note 48, para. 70; Case of Ibsen Cárdenas and Ibsen Peña, supra note 28, para. 47, and Case of Rosendo Cantú et al., supra note 27, para. 52. 59 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Perú. Merits. Judgment of September 17, 1997. Series C No. 33, para. 43; Case of Ibsen Cárdenas and Ibsen Peña, supra note 28, para. 47, and Case of Rosendo Cantú et al., supra note 27, para. 52. 60 Cf. Case of Reverón Trujillo, supra note 17, para. 43; Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, supra note 11, para. 57, and Case of Anzualdo Castro v. Perú. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 22, 2009. Series C No. 202, para. 28.