52 sanctions, constitute an expression of the State’s punitive power and that, on occasions, the nature of the former is similar to that of the latter.182 In a democratic society punitive power is exercised only to the extent that is strictly necessary in order to protect fundamental legal rights from serious attacks that may impair or endanger them. The opposite would result in the abusive exercise of the punitive power of the State.183 Similarly, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention sustained that right to personal liberty “requires that States should have recourse to deprivation of liberty only insofar as it is necessary to meet a pressing societal need, and in a manner proportionate to that need.”184 171. Based on this principle, it is deduced that the detention of people for noncompliance with immigration laws should never involve punitive purposes. Hence, a custodial measure should only be applied when it is necessary and proportionate in the specific case to the purposes mentioned supra and only for the shortest period of time. Therefore, it is essential for States to seek alternatives to detention whenever possible,185 which may be effective for the achievement of the purposes described. As a consequence, those migratory policies whose central focus is the mandatory detention of irregular migrants, without ordering the competent authorities to verify in each particular case and by means of an individualized evaluation, the possibility of using less restrictive measures of achieving the same ends, are arbitrary.186 172. Based on the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal deems that Article 67 of Decree Law 16 of 1960 did not follow a lawful purpose and was disproportionate, given that it established a punitive penalty for aliens who evade a previous order for deportation and, therefore, resulted in arbitrary detentions. In brief, the deprivation of liberty imposed on Mr. Vélez Loor, based on such norm, constituted a violation of Article 7(3) of the Convention in relation to Article 1(1) of the same treaty. g) Notification of Order 7306 of December 6, 2002 and remedies regarding the punitive ruling 173. The Commission argued, in the first place, that, according to the immigration law in force at the time of the events, “the right to appeal before a court, which would ensure the guarantees of independence and impartiality, did not exist;” in the second place, that the “criminal penalty was imposed by means of an administrative act,” which in Panama “was legal on a presumptive basis and could only be judicially challenged once a series of administrative remedies had been exhausted and based on sufficient grounds capable of disproving said presumption;” in the third place, that the remedies mentioned by the State “cannot be considered adequate in order to obtain the entire review of the criminal penalty like the one imposed on the [alleged] victim and, finally, that due to the lack of notice and legal counsel, the remedies were not at the disposal of Mr. Vélez Loor.” 174. The representatives indicated that "the Panamanian legislation in force at the time of the events did not provide that the decision made by the General Director of Migration could be reviewed, in second instance, by a court or tribunal.” Furthermore, they pointed out that the alleged victim had no effective access to the remedies 182 Cf. Case of Baena Ricardo et al., supra note 139, para. 106. 183 Cf. Case of Kimel, supra note 43, para. 76; Case of Usón Ramírez, supra note 10, para. 73, and Case of Tristán Donoso, supra note 120, para. 119. 184 United Nations, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Group Report, Civil and Political Rights, in particular those issues related to Torture and Detention, E/CN.4/2006/7, December 12, 2005, para. 63. 185 Cf. United Nations, “Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development,” Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Group Report, A/HRC/10/21, February 16, 2009, para. 67. 186 Cf. United Nations, Human Rights Committee, C. v. Australia, Communication No 900/1999: Australia. 13/11/2002, CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999, of November 13, 2002, para. 8.2