35. The Court considers that the specific circumstances of this case require an interpretation of the six-month requirement established in Article 46(1)(b). The Court takes into account that the phenomenon of infertility generates different reactions that cannot be associated with a strict rule on the courses of action that a person should necessarily take. A couple may take months or years to decide whether to use a specific technique of assisted reproduction or other alternatives. Thus, the criterion of the time when the alleged victim learns of his or her infertility is a limited criterion in the circumstances of this case, where it is not possible to place the burden on the victims to make the decision to lodge a petition before the inter-American system within a specific time frame. Similarly, the European Court has indicated that the “six-month rule is autonomous and must be construed and applied according to the facts of each individual case, so as to ensure the effective exercise of the right to individual petition.” 42 36. Therefore, the Court considers that in this case there are no elements to cause it to diverge from the admissibility decision adopted by the Inter-American Commission, given that: (a) the judgment delivered by the highest instance of the constitutional jurisdiction continues to be in force; (b) the victims did not have to be aware of their infertility at the time this judgment was issued, and (c) the petition was lodged during the year after it was learned that this judgment would prevent access to IVF. 37. Based on the foregoing, the Court rejects the preliminary objection filed by the State. C) Lack of competence of the Court to hear “new facts not included” in the “facts of the application” 38. The State argued that “both representatives included in their briefs with pleadings the State’s responsibility for exposing the situation of the presumed victims to the media, owing to the media coverage during the proceedings before both the Commission and this Court.” Similarly, the State argued that “none of the facts denounced by the representatives [in this regard] is included in the facts alleged by the Commission, and it cannot be considered that they are derived from the main or supervening facts.” Therefore, it asked the Court “to declare inadmissible the petitions of the presumed victims related to facts not included by the Commission in the application it submitted.” 39. Representative Molina indicated that “since the facts contested by the State are supervening facts and have a direct causal relationship to the fact that gave rise to the human rights violations in this case, it is fully in keeping with the proceedings” that “they have been presented” for the Court’s consideration. Representative May argued that these are not “new facts,” “they are situations all of which fall within the factual scenario of the prohibition” of IVF; in other words, they are “all conducts, personal situations, experiences, decisions and actions, and events that occurred in the life of the victims owing to the prohibition.” He added that the corresponding decision should be made when deciding the merits of the case. Considerations of the Court 42 Cf. ECHR, Sabri Günes v. Turkey, Grand Chamber, judgment of 29 June 2012, Büyükdağ v. Turkey (dec.), no. 28340/95, judgment of 6 April 2000; Fernández-Molina González and 369 Others v. Spain (dec.), no. 64359/01, judgment of 8 October 2002, and Zakrzewska v. Poland, no. 49927/06, para. 55, judgment of 16 December 2008.