the State has argued that it was a “relative prohibition,” inasmuch as the practice of IVF could be regulated when the technique was able to comply with the requirements established by the Constitutional Chamber in its judgment; in other words when, in the words of the State, IVF does not endanger “the right to life from the moment of conception.” 158. In this regard, the Court observes that the Constitutional Chamber’s judgment included a concept of absolute protection of the life of the embryo, because it stated that “since the right is declared in favor of everyone, without exception – any exception or limitation destroys the very content of the right – it must be protected for those who are born and also for the unborn.” 254 Despite the foregoing, the Constitutional Chamber indicated that “advances in science and biotechnology are so rapid that the technique could be improved in such a way that the concerns that have been indicated disappear”; 255 thus the Chamber stated that “it [should be expressly recorded that, not even by norm of legal rank, is it possible to authorize legally [the] application of [IVF], at least, […] while its scientific development remains at its current stage and entails the conscious damage to human life.” 256 159. The Court notes that the Constitutional Chamber considered that, if the IVF technique could be applied respecting the concept of absolute protection of the life of the embryo, it could be practiced in the country. However, the Court considers that, although the Constitutional Chamber’s judgment accepted the practice of IVF in the country under certain conditions, the fact is that 12 years after the judgment was delivered, this technique is not practiced in Costa Rica (supra para. 67). Therefore, the Court considers that the “suspended status” established in the judgment has not produced any real practical effects to date. Consequently, without proceeding to define it as an “absolute” or “relative” prohibition, it is possible to conclude that the Constitutional Chamber’s decision resulted in the undisputed fact that IVF is not practiced in Costa Rican territory and that, therefore, couples wishing to use this technique cannot do so in this country. In addition, since the Constitutional Chamber conditioned the possibility of applying the technique to ensuring that there was no embryonic loss whatsoever, in practice, this entails a prohibition of IVF, because the evidence in the case file indicates that, to date, there is no option for practicing IVF without some possibility of embryonic loss. 257 In other words, it would be impossible to comply with the condition imposed by the Chamber. 160. Although the practical effect has been mentioned above, the Court considers that the restriction or interference caused to the presumed victims by the Constitutional Chamber’s decision could not be foreseen adequately. In this regard, the Court recalls that a norm or mandate is foreseeable, if it is worded with sufficient precision to allow a person to regulate his conduct based on it. 258 In this regard, the Court observes that the judgment was not 254 Judgment No. 2000-02306 of March 15, 2000, delivered by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Case file No. 95-001734-007-CO (file of annexes to the merits report, volume I, folio 90). 255 Judgment No. 2000-02306 of March 15, 2000, delivered by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Case file No. 95-001734-007-CO (file of annexes to the merits report, volume I, folio 95). 256 Judgment No. 2000-02306 of March 15, 2000, delivered by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Case file No. 95-001734-007-CO (file of annexes to the merits report, volume I, folio 95). 257 Cf. Opinion of expert witness Zegers-Hochschild (merits report, volume VI, folio 2848) and of expert witness Garza (merits report, volume VI, folio 2576). 258 Cf. Case of López Mendoza v. Venezuela. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 1, 2011. Series C No. 233, para. 199; See also ECHR, Case of Landvreugd v. The Netherlands, (No. 37331/97), Judgment of 4 June 2002. Final, 4 September 2002, para. 59 (“[T]he Court reiterates that a rule is ‘foreseeable’ if it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable any individual – if need be with appropriate advice – to regulate his conduct”).