international instruments for the protection of human rights. 264 Within this framework, the Court will now make an interpretation that is: (i) in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms; (ii) systematic and historic; (iii) evolutive, and (iv) of the object and purpose of the treaty. C.1) 174. Interpretation in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms Article 1 of the American Convention establishes: 1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition. 2. 175. For the purposes of this Convention, “person” means every human being. (Underlining added) Article 4(1) of the American Convention states: Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. 176. In this case the Court observes that the concept of “person” is a legal term that is analyzed in many of the domestic legal systems of the States Parties. However, for the purposes of the interpretation of Article 4(1), the definition of person stems from the mentions made in the treaty with regard to “conception” and to “human being,” terms whose scope should be assessed based on the scientific literature. 177. The Court notes that the Constitutional Court chose one of the scientific positions on this issue to define as of when it was considered that life began (supra para. 73). On this basis, the Constitutional Court understood that conception would be the moment when the egg is fertilized and assumed that, as of that moment, a person existed who held the right to life (supra para. 73). 178. In this regard, in the instant case, the parties also forwarded as evidence a series of scientific articles and expert opinions that will be used in the following paragraphs to determine the scope of the literal interpretation of the terms “conception,” “person” and “human being.” In addition, the Court will refer to the literal meaning of the expression “in general” in Article 4(1) of the Convention. 179. The Court underlines that the evidence in the case file shows that IVF has transformed the discussion on how the phenomenon of “conception” is understood. Indeed, IVF has revealed that some time may elapse between the fusion of the egg and the spermatozoid and implantation. Therefore, the definition of “conception” accepted by the authors of the American Convention has changed. Prior to IVF, the possibility of fertilization occurring outside a woman’s body was not contemplated scientifically. 265 180. The Court observes that in the current scientific context there are two different 264 Cf. Case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru. Competence. Judgment of September 24, 1999. Series C No. 54, para. 38, and Case of González et al. (“Cotton field”) v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, para. 244, para. 33. 265 In this regard, expert witness Zegers-Hochschild indicated that, “in 1969, no one imagined that it would be possible to create human life outside a woman’s body. It was 10 years later that the birth of the first baby using ART was announced.” Written summary of the expert opinion provided by Fernando Zegers-Hochschild at the public hearing before the Court (merits report, volume VI, folio 2846).