Nevertheless, it is clear to the Court that some opinions view a fertilized egg as a complete human life. Some of these opinions may be associated with concepts that confer certain metaphysical attributes on embryos. Such concepts cannot justify preference being given to a certain type of scientific literature when interpreting the scope of the right to life established in the American Convention, because this would imply imposing specific types of beliefs on others who do not share them. 186. Despite the foregoing, the Court considers that it is appropriate to define how to interpret the term “conception” in relation to the American Convention. In this regard, the Court underscores that the scientific evidence agrees in making a difference between two complementary and essential moments of embryonic development: fertilization and implantation. The Court observes that it is only after completion of the second moment that the cycle is concluded, and that conception can be understood to have occurred. Taking into account the scientific evidence presented by the parties in this case, the Court notes that, even though, once the egg has been fertilized, this gives rise to a different cell with sufficient genetic information for the potential development of a “human being,” the fact is that if this embryo is not implanted in a woman’s body its possibilities of development are nil. If an embryo never manages to implant itself in the uterus, it could not develop, because it would not receive the necessary nutrients, nor would it be in a suitable environment for its development (supra para. 180). 187. Thus, the Court considers that the term “conception” cannot be understood as a moment or process exclusive of a woman’s body, given that an embryo has no chance of survival if implantation does not occur. Proof of this is that it is only possible to establish whether or not pregnancy has occurred once the fertilized egg has been implanted in the uterus, when the hormone known as “chorionic gonadotropin” is produced, which can only be detected in a woman who has an embryo implanted in her. 285 Prior to this, it is impossible to determine whether the union between the egg and a spermatozoid occurred within the body or whether this union was lost prior to implantation. In addition, it has already been pointed out that when Article 4 of the American Convention was drafted the dictionary of the Real Academia differentiated between the moment of fertilization and the moment of conception, understanding conception as implantation (supra para. 181). When drafting the relevant provisions in the American Convention, the moment of fertilization was not mentioned. 188. Furthermore, with regard to the expression “in general,” the Diccionario de la Real Academia Española states that this means “in common, generally” or “without specifying or individualizing anything.” 286 According to the structure of the second phrase of Article 4(1) of the Convention, the term “in general” is related to the expression “from the moment of conception.” The literal interpretation indicates that the expression relates to anticipating possible exceptions to a particular rule. The other methods of interpretation would suggest the meaning of a provision that contemplates exceptions. 189. Taking the above into account, the Court understands the word “conception” from the moment at which implantation occurs, and therefore considers that, before this event, Article 4 of the American Convention cannot be applied. In addition, the term “in general” infers exceptions to a rule, but the interpretation in keeping with the ordinary meaning does not allow the scope of those exceptions to be specified. 285 Cf. Written summary of the expert opinion provided by Fernando Zegers-Hochschild at the public hearing before the Court (merits report, volume VI, folio 2846). 286 Cf. Diccionario de la Real Academia de la Lengua http://lema.rae.es/drae/?val=en%20general (Last visited November 28, 2012). Española. Available at: