190. However, taking into consideration that Article 4(1) is a matter that is the subject of the discussion in this case and also in the context of the deliberations of the Constitutional Chamber, the Court finds it appropriate to interpret this article using the following methods of interpretation, namely the systematic and historical, and the evolutionary and teleological interpretation. C.2) Systematic and historical interpretation 191. The Court emphasizes that, according to the systematic argument, norms should be interpreted as part of a whole, the meaning and scope of which must be defined based on the legal system to which they belong. 287 Thus, the Court has considered that “the interpretation of a treaty should take into account not only the agreements and instruments formally related to it (Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention), but also its context (Article 31(3))”; 288 in other words, international human rights law. 192. In this case, the Constitutional Chamber and the State based their arguments on an interpretation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter “ICCPR”), the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child. In particular, the State affirmed that treaties other than the American Convention require the absolute protection of prenatal life. The Court will proceed to examine this argument based on a general assessment of the provisions established by the protection systems in relation to the protection of the right to life. Accordingly, it will analyze: (i) the inter-American system; (ii) the universal system; (iii) the European system, and (iv) the African system. 193. Moreover, according to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, “the supplementary means of interpretation, especially the preparatory work of the treaty, can be used in order to confirm the meaning resulting from that interpretation or when it leaves an ambiguous or obscure meaning, or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” 289 This means that they are usually used only in a subsidiary manner, 290 after the methods of interpretation set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention have been used, in order to confirm the meaning that was found or to establish whether ambiguity remains in the interpretation or whether the application is absurd or unreasonable. However, in the present case, the Court considers that Article 31(4) of the Vienna Convention, which provides that a special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended, is relevant for determining the interpretation of Article 4(1) of the American Convention. Therefore, the interpretation of the text of Article 4(1) of the Convention is directly related to meaning intended by the States Parties to the Convention. C.2.a) Inter-American human rights system 287 Cf. Case of González et al. (“Cotton field”) v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, para. 43. 288 Cf. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of October 1, 1999. Series A No. 16, para. 113, and Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Reparations and costs. Judgment of May 26, 2001. Series C No. 192. 289 Cf. Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4.2 and 4.4 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-3/83 of September 8, 1983. Series A No. 3, para. 49 290 Cf. Case of González et al. (“Cotton field”) v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, para. 68