It is neither desirable, nor even possible as matters stand, to answer in the abstract the question of whether the unborn child is a person for the purposes of Article 2 of the Convention […]. 373 (bold type and underlining added) 238. In the case A, B and C v. Ireland, 374 the European Court reiterated that: The question of when the right to life begins came within the States’ margin of appreciation because there was no European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the beginning of life, so that it was impossible to answer the question whether the unborn was a person to be protected for the purposes of Article 2. Since the rights claimed on behalf of the fetus and those of the mother are inextricably interconnected […], the margin of appreciation accorded to a State’s protection of the unborn necessarily translates into a margin of appreciation for that State as to how it balances the conflicting rights of the mother. 239. However, the ECHR made it clear that “this margin of appreciation is not unlimited” and that “the Court must supervise whether the interference constitutes a proportionate balancing of the competing interests involved […]. A prohibition of abortion to protect unborn life is not therefore automatically justified under the Convention on the basis of unqualified deference to the protection of pre-natal life or on the basis that the expectant mother’s right to respect for her private life is of a lesser stature.” 375 240. Regarding cases relating to the practice of in vitro fertilization, in the case of Evans v. United Kingdom, the ECHR had to rule on the presumed violation of the right to life of preserved embryos because domestic law required their destruction after the partner of the applicant had withdrawn his consent for their implantation. The Grand Chamber of the ECHR reiterated its case law established in the case of Vo. v. France, stating that: In the absence of any European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the beginning of life, the issue of when the right to life begins comes within the margin of appreciation which the Court generally considers that States should enjoy in this sphere. Under English law, as was made clear by the domestic courts in the present applicant’s case […], an embryo does not have independent rights or interests and cannot claim—or have claimed on its behalf—a right to life under Article 2. 376 241. The Grand Chamber of the ECHR confirmed the decision regarding the non-violation of the right to life, recognized in Article 2, when indicating that “the embryos created by the applicant and [her partner] do not have a right to life within the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention, and that there has not, therefore, been a violation of that provision.” 377 242. In the cases of S.H. v. Austria 378 and Costa and Pavan v. Italy, 379 which related respectively, to the regulation of IVF with respect to egg and spermatozoid donation by third parties, and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, the ECHR did not even refer to an alleged violation of a specific right of the embryos. C.2.d) African human rights system 243. Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights establishes that “[h]uman beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life 373 ECHR, Case of Vo. v. France, (No. 53924/00), GC, Judgment of 8 July 2004, paras. 75, 82, 84 and 85. 374 ECHR, Case of A, B and C v. Ireland, (No. 25579/05), Judgment of 16 December 2010, para. 237. 375 ECHR, Case of A, B and C v. Ireland, (No. 25579/05), Judgment of 16 December 2010, para. 238. 376 ECHR, Case of Evans v. United Kingdom, (No. 6339/05), Judgment of 10 April 2007, para. 54. 377 ECHR, Case of Evans v. United Kingdom, (No. 6339/05), Judgment of 10 April 2007, para. 56. 378 Cf. ECHR, Case of S.H. et al. v. Austria, (No. 57813/00), Judgment of 3 November 2011. 379 Cf. ECHR, Case of Costa and Pavan v. Italy, (No. 54270/10). Judgment of 28 August 2012.