the rights and freedoms recognized in the Convention or limit them to a greater extent that the Convention establishes. 260. In this regard, the Court considers that other judgments in comparative constitutional law endeavor to find an adequate balance between possible competing rights and, consequently, constitute a relevant reference to interpret the scope of the expression “in general, from the moment of conception” contained in Article 4(1). The Court will now refer to some examples of case law in which a legitimate interest in protecting prenatal life is recognized, but where this interest is differentiated from entitlement of the right to life, stressing that any intent to protect the former interest must be harmonized with the fundamental rights of other individuals, especially the mother. 261. In the European sphere, for example, the German Constitutional Court, stressing the State’s general obligation to protect the unborn child, has established that “[t]he protection of life, […] is not so absolute to the extent that, without any exception, it enjoys prevalence over all the other rights,” 418 and that “[t]he fundamental rights of women […] subsist in the face of the right to life of the nasciturus and, consequently, must be protected.” 419 Moreover, according to the Constitutional Court of Spain, “[t]he protection that the Constitution provides to the nasciturus […] does not mean that the said protection must be of an absolute nature.” 420 262. In the Americas, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that “[i]t is reasonable and logical for a State, at certain times, to protect other interests […] such as, for example, those of the potential human life,” which should be weighed with the personal intimacy of the woman – which cannot be understood as an absolute right – and “other circumstances and values.” 421 Furthermore, according to the Constitutional Court of Colombia, “[a]lthough it corresponds to Congress to adopt appropriate measures to comply with the obligation to protect life, […] this does not mean that all the measures that it takes to this end are justified, because, despite its constitutional relevance, life does not have the nature of an absolute value or right and must be weighed with the other constitutional values, principles and rights.” 422 The Argentine Supreme Court of Justice has indicated that no mandate is derived from either the American Declaration or the American Convention under which the scope of the criminal norms that permit abortion in certain circumstances must be interpreted restrictively, “because the wording of the pertinent provisions of these instruments was expressly delimited so that the invalidity of a supposed abortion [such as the one established in the Argentine Penal Code] could not be derived from them.” 423 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Justice of Mexico has declared that, based on the fact that life is a necessary condition for the existence of other rights, it cannot be validly concluded that life should be considered more valuable than any of those other rights. 424 418 BVerfG, Judgment BVerfGE 88, 203, 28 May 1993, 2 BvF 2/90 and 4, 5/92, para. D.I.2.b. 419 BVerfG, Judgment BVerfGE 88, 203, 28 May 1993, 2 BvF 2/90 and 4, 5/92, para. D.I.2.c.aa. 420 Constitutional Court of Spain, Judgment on action on unconstitutionality 53/1985, 11 April 1985, paras. 8 and 12. 421 United States Supreme Court, Case of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 115, 157 (1973) 422 Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment C-355 of 2006, VI.5. 423 Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina, “F., A.L. ref/ self-realization measure” Judgment of March 13, 2012, F. 259. XLVI., Considering paragraph 10. 424 Cf. Judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation of August 28, 2008, action on unconstitutionality 146/2007 and joindered action 147/2007. In particular, the judgment indicated that: “In other words, we can accept as true that unless one is alive, one is unable to exercise any right; but, we cannot infer from this that the right to life enjoys pre-eminence in the face of any other right. To accept a similar argument would force us to accept also, for example, that the right to food is more important than the right to life, because the