263. Consequently, the Court concludes that the object and purpose of the expression “in general” in Article 4(1) of the Convention is to allow, as appropriate, an adequate balance between competing rights and interests. In the case that the Court is examining, it is sufficient to indicate that the said object and purpose implies that the absolute protection of the embryo cannot be alleged, annulling other rights. C.5) Conclusion on the interpretation of Article 4(1) 264. The Court has used different methods of interpretation that have led to similar results according to which the embryo cannot be understood to be a person for the purposes of Article 4(1) of the American Convention. In addition, after analyzing the available scientific data, the Court has concluded that “conception” in the sense of Article 4(1) occurs at the moment when the embryo becomes implanted in the uterus, which explains why, before this event, Article 4 of the Convention would not be applicable. Moreover, it can be concluded from the words “in general” that the protection of the right to life under this provision is not absolute, but rather gradual and incremental according to its development, since it is not an absolute and unconditional obligation, but entails understanding that exceptions to the general rule are admissible. D) Proportionality of the prohibition Arguments of the Commission and allegations of the parties 265. The Commission indicated that the requirements of legality, necessity and suitability had been met. However, the Commission considered that, when analyzing suitability, the scientific evidence “that the assisted reproduction technique of [IVF] imposes a risk of embryo loss [… that] is comparable to the natural reproduction process” “may be relevant.” Regarding the need for the measure, the Commission indicated that “there were less restrictive ways to accomplish the State’s objective and to reconcile the interests at stake; for example, by some other form of regulation that could produce results that more closely resembled the natural process of conception, such as a regulation that reduced the number of eggs fertilized.” Lastly, it argued that “sufficient elements exist to conclude that: (i) “the rights affected, […] are particularly relevant for the identity of a person and his or her autonomy”; (ii) “the protection of life in the comparative constitutional and international sphere is usually subject to degrees of protect that are applied incrementally”; (iii) “the severe nature of the impact on the rights involved” should be considered, because “[t]he effect was equivalent to an annulment of the exercise of their rights; (iv) “it is feasible to consider that, in the practice, the ban on [IVF] does not contribute to a significant protection of the life of the embryos, if it is compared to the high frequency [of embryonic loss] in the natural conception process,” and (v) it is important to mention “the consistency and coherence of the State’s action in relation to the embryo,” because there are “practices that are currently allowed in Costa Rica [… that] entail a risk of fertilization of the said eggs, of embryonic loss, and of multiple pregnancies.” The Commission observed that the ban on IVF “had two effects that fall within the scope of the right to equality: (i) it prevented the [presumed] victims from overcoming their situation of disadvantage by benefitting from scientific progress, in particular, from a medical treatment, and (ii) it had a specific and disproportionate impact on women.” former is a condition for the latter.” For its part, the Federal Supreme Court of Brazil has indicated that “in order for an embryo – in vitro – to be recognized the full right to life, it would be necessary to recognize the right to a uterus; a view that is not established in the Constitution.” Federal Supreme Court. Action on unconstitutionality No. 3,510 of May 29, 2008, p. 5.