128. With regard to the specific role of prosecutors, this Court has highlighted that they perform the duties of judicial officers and, as such, they need to enjoy guarantees of job stability, among others, as a basic condition of their independence for the due compliance of their procedural role. Therefore, they are protected by the guarantees of an appropriate appointment, of tenure in office and protection against external pressure. Otherwise, the independence and objectivity that are required in their role would be jeopardized as principles aimed at ensuring that the investigations carried out and the claims made before the jurisdictional bodies are directed exclusively to the achieving justice in each specific case, consistent with the scope of Article 8 of the Convention. 120 In this regard, it should be added that the Court has specified that the lack of guarantee of nonremovability of prosecutors, making them vulnerable to reprisals for the decisions they take, entails a violation of the independence guaranteed, precisely, by Article 8(1) of the Convention. 121 In this regard, this Court refers to the judgments of the cases Martínez Esquivia v. Colombia and Casa Nina v. Peru in which it established that the independence recognized for prosecutors constitutes the guarantee that they will not be subject to political pressure or undue interference in their actions, or retaliation for the decisions that they have objectively assumed, which precisely requires the guarantee of stability and tenure in office. 122. 129. By virtue of the foregoing considerations, this Court reiterates that the guarantee of stability and tenure in office, for judges and prosecutors implies, in turn, (i) that removal from their positions must exclusively obey grounds permitted, either through a process that complies with judicial guarantees or because they have completed the term of their mandate; (ii) that judges and prosecutors can only be dismissed for serious misconduct or incompetence; and (iii) that all proceedings must be decided in accordance with the established norms of judicial behavior and through fair procedures that ensure objectivity and impartiality according to the Constitution or the law. 123. 130. Meanwhile, in this case, the Commission and the representatives argued that the process to which the alleged victims were subjected is punitive and disciplinary in nature. The State argued that the process of evaluation and ratification of judges and prosecutors is different from a disciplinary process, 124 since its purpose is to evaluate the suitability and conduct of the magistrates to continue in the performing their jurisdictional or prosecutorial role, and seeks to determine which person has the necessary qualities to continue in the position. 131. To resolve this issue, the Court refers to the decision in the case of Moya Solís v. Peru, since in that case Ms. Moya Solís was also subjected to an evaluation process, and this Court established that: this process evaluated the performance of the alleged victim, in order to establish whether she was ratified in her position or dismissed. The State alleged that evaluation processes differ from disciplinary processes, since the former seek to evaluate the officer from time to time, while the latter seek to establish whether the officer committed an administrative infringement. However, both processes are aimed at evaluating an officer’s conduct and suitability, either periodically or as a result of an alleged infringement. In addition, when an evaluation process concludes that the officer’s performance rating was not satisfactory and the Cf. Case of Martínez Esquivia v. Colombia, supra, para. 88 and 94, and Case of Casa Nina v. Peru, supra, para. 72 and 78. 121 Cf. Case of Valencia Hinojosa et al. v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 29, 2016. Series C No. 327, para. 110 and 119, and Case of Casa Nina v. Peru, supra, para. 72. 122 Cf. Case of Martínez Esquivia v. Colombia, supra, para. 96, and Case of Casa Nina v. Peru, supra, para. 80. 123 Cf. Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra, para. 77, and Case of Ríos Avalos et al. v. Paraguay, supra, para. 88. 124 According to expert witness Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes, “it is possible to affirm that there are three possible processes: (i) sanctioning processes, aimed at determining whether or not the official committed a serious offense; (ii) those processes aimed at determining if for a certain reason, even if it is not due to his fraud or fault, the official lacks the capacity to continue in office, (iii) the so-called confirmation processes.” Cf. Expert opinion of Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes submitted by affidavit to be presented before the Court on March 4, 2021 (evidence file, fs. 3314 to 3335). 120 34