its notification, which is the time frame for appealing; in other words, without the decision ordering the deportation being final. Hence, it can be stated that what took place was a proceeding in absentia, expressly and totally incompatible with the Convention. Regarding the right to judicial protection, they added that, even though an administrative appeal was possible, the immigration authorities took away its effectiveness, because not only did they not notify the Pacheco Tineo family of the decisions, but also the deportation decision was executed immediately. Even if not every administrative decision on deportation must be re-examined by the courts, judges must retain a minimum control of the legality and reasonableness of the decisions of the Administration, in order to satisfy the obligation to guarantee the right to a prompt and effective remedy established in Article 25 of the Convention. A.3 Arguments of the State 122. The State argued that the Pacheco Tineo family had circumvented all the immigration controls of several countries. The State indicated that the presumed victims had not complied with the essential conditions to obtain refugee status. It stressed, in general, that the considerations and grounds set out by the Commission and the representatives “do not explain or justify the voluntary presence of the Pacheco family in Peru,” who were freely traveling in Peru, taking steps that a normal person would take who has no fear of being in any danger to his integrity or life, or that of his children. It considered that this is the crucial element that the Court should examine, because, to the contrary, it would be “protecting abuse, fraud, lies, to the benefit of the Pacheco Tineo family, [who] cannot obtain benefits, if they do not respect the noble principles for which refugee status was conceived.” 123. The State argued that it had sufficient reason to apply the exclusion clause “1.F.b)” of the 1951 Convention to the members of the Pacheco Tineo family, considering that “Mr. Pacheco and Mrs. Tineo were being prosecuted for terrorism and sought by INTERPOL, at the request of a Peruvian court.” It argued that people may request protection as refugees based on credible reasons and not to prevent return to the immigration authorities of the country of origin. Thus, even according to UNHCR directives, it is acceptable for abusive or fraudulent applications to be processed by accelerated proceedings and, in this case, “they were seeking “asylum à la carte,” in keeping with their interests.” It argued that it was only weeks after the facts that “the State became aware” that the petitioners had refugee status in Chile, which prevented them from applying for a new refugee status. According to the international laws on refugees, when a person has to leave the country where he has asylum to return to the country of origin or where his or her life was in danger, this must necessarily be done with a special passport granted by the State or by UNHCR, for a limited time and on justification of the urgency of the trip, requirements with which the Pacheco Tineo family did not comply. 124. Regarding the alleged violation of Article 25(1) of the Convention, the State argued that the laws of Bolivia include guarantees concerning the remedy of amparo and habeas corpus. It asserted that “Mr. Pacheco and his wife had every right and the necessary time to file these remedies, which, of their own free will, they did not exhaust.” 125. In its final written arguments, the State asked the Court to examine “separately, and in keeping with the specific content of each right, the alleged violations of the right to due process of law recognized in Article 8 (if the argument of subsidiarity is not admitted), and the alleged violation of the rights established in Article 22(7) and 22(8) of the American Convention. The State asked the Court, if it did not consider the preceding arguments, to examine carefully whether all the subparagraphs of Article 8(2) of the Convention should really be applicable to requests for refugee status, and whether, at the time of the facts, a requirement of this nature was binding for the State, since there were no binding instruments of international law or rulings of the Court that required this specific conduct by the State. 40