the wrongful acts that were reported, so that they would be subject to a criminal trial and punishment and, consequently, provide adequate reparation to the victims for the harm caused to them.” 246. With regard to the request to investigate the supposed cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, the State considered that it was not in order to require an investigation of facts about which the Bolivian authorities had not been informed, that had not been proved, and that did not constitute a violation of the Convention. Regarding the supposed shortcomings in the immigration procedures, the State recalled that, under Bolivian laws, offenses that could relate to these facts have already prescribed, 279 because they do not constitute gross human rights violations.280 Lastly, the State observed that Bolivia’s domestic law establishes the action for indemnity against public officials who commit acts or omissions in the exercise of their functions.281 Based on all the foregoing, the State asked the Court to abstain from granting the reparation requested. Considerations of the Court 247. In Chapter VII of this Judgment, the Court decided that the State had incurred international responsibility for the violation of the rights recognized in Articles 5(1), 17, 19, 22(7), 22(8), 8 and 25 of the Convention, owing to the acts and omissions of various SENAMIG and CONARE officials. 248. As regards the request to order an investigation into the presumed violations of the physical integrity of the members of the Pacheco Tineo family, the Court did not rule on these violations, so that it is not in order to require the State to conduct investigations in this regard, without prejudice to any investigations that may be appropriate at the domestic level in accordance with Bolivian laws. 249. In addition, the Court recalls that the State indicated that the facts of the case had prescribed, but made no specific reference to the criminal laws regarding which it was applying the statute of limitations, and only referred to time frames of prescription for administrative responsibility, without clarifying the time frame for other types of responsibility (administrative, executive, civil and criminal) to which the State itself had referred. Thus, although it is true that it is the Court’s consistent case law that acts that do not constitute gross human rights violations may prescribe as established in the domestic law of the States,282 it is also true that the State has not provided sufficiently precise factual and legal elements for the Court to determine whether the prescription of the criminal action in this specific case is in conformity with the Convention. 279 Specifically, the State indicated that the Law on Government Administration and Control of July 20, 1990, regulates the systems of administration and control of State resources (“SAFCO” Act), and establishes the types of responsibility of the public service, namely: administrative, executive, civil and criminal. It also indicated that the first part of article 29 of the SAFCO Act establishes that administrative responsibilities exist when the act or omission of the public servant infringes the legal-administrative law and the norms that regulate his official conduct. It also indicated that article 16 of Supreme Decree 23318-A of November 3, 1992, which regulates responsibilities in the public service, establishes that administrative responsibility prescribes two years after the date on which the violation was committed for both public servants in the exercise of their functions and for former public servants. It also considered that the supposed facts that originate this case date from 2001, so that more than the two years established by law have passed, and the administrative responsibility has prescribed. 280 The State argued that the facts of this case do not constitute gross human rights violations, which are not subject to the statute of limitations and, consequently, the Court cannot order the investigation of facts in cases that have prescribed. 281 In particular, the State alluded to article 113 of the Bolivian Constitution, without this being contested by the representatives, which establishes the action for indemnity against public officials found responsible by act or omission in the performance of their functions. 282 Cf. Case of Albán Cornejo et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 22, 2007. Series C No. 171, para. 111, and Case of Vera Vera et al. v. Ecuador. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 19, 2011. Series C No. 226, para. 117 75