the disappearance and murder of women), and the “second moment” (before the discovery of the body of Claudina Velásquez: specific obligation to prevent violations of the rights to integrity and life of Claudina Velásquez”), in order to corroborate the existence of Guatemala’s international responsibility.71 41. Regarding the “first moment” — before the disappearance Claudina Velásquez — I consider it pertinent to underline the Court’s analysis regarding the existence, in 2001, of a context of an escalation of homicidal violence against women in Guatemala.72 Also, the subsequent mention of the measures taken by the State following the case of Veliz Franco et al. v. Guatemala, as well as the measures and mechanisms implemented by the State before and after the facts of the case examined in this judgment,73 which it then compared with with reports of national and international agencies and organizations that criticized the effectiveness of such measures and institutions,74 while acknowledging the State’s initiative of implementing “actions aimed at addressing the problem of violence against women,” but revealing the insufficiency of such measures.75 In this regard, I should stress that the analysis of this “first moment” does not conclude with a ruling by the Court, which I consider should have been made owing to its importance and the special consequences on the following moment (the “second moment”). 42. When examining the “second moment” — before the discovery of the body of Claudina Velásquez — the Court analyzed, on the one hand, the moment at “which the State authorities knew or ought to have known about the existence of a real and immediate danger to the life and integrity of Claudina Velásquez” determining that this was the moment at which the authorities received the telephone call from the victim’s parents; 76 and, on the other hand, “the steps taken by the Guatemalan authorities, knowing the context and the nature of the danger reported, [and also whether they] promptly took the necessary measures within the scope of their powers” to prevent or avoid that danger.77 43. In this regard, and following an analysis of the facts already described in the judgment, it determined that the response of the authorities had been “clearly insufficient given the possibility that the [victim’s] personal integrity and life were in danger,”78 and also the lack of clarity in the law regarding the proper moment to file a report, 79 considering that the action of the authorities had not involved the adoption of the necessary measures to prevent or avoid the danger reported by the victims.80 Consequently, he Court considered that Articles 2 of the American Convention and 7 of the “Convention of Belém do Pará” had been violated owing to the lack of capacity, sensitivity, willingness and training to respond to missing person Para. 110 of the judgment. Para. 111 of the judgment. 73 Paras. 112 and ff. of the judgment. 74 Para. 118 a 120 of the judgment. 75 Para. 120 of the judgment. 76 Para. 121 of the judgment. 77 Para. 123 of the judgment. 78 Para. 126 of the judgment. 79 In this regard, it its worth mentioning, first, that the Court noted the lack of clarity as to the moment as of which the 24-hour period before presentation of the report that Claudina Velásquez was missing should have been calculated. Second, in response to its request to the State for information concerning the existence of any law or practice according to which it was necessary to wait 24 hours to receive missing person reports, the State indicated that “there is no provision in domestic law” relating to this lapse and, third, the law on which the State argued that the agents had based their actions (article 51 of Decree No. 40-90 of the Organic Law of the Public Prosecution Service) did not indicate the actions that the authorities should have taken in that case and made no reference to receiving the report, reflecting confusion “as to the rules that the police should follow.” Paras. 128 to 131 of the judgment. 80 Para. 132 of the judgment. 71 72 12