57. Consequently, the undersigned finds it pertinent to indicate that, given the context of violence faced by women in Guatemala and, consequently, the enhanced obligation of the State to prevent this situation, the Court should have declared the international responsibility of the State for failing to comply with its general obligation of prevention when examining the “first moment” of the measures adopted by the State. This is because this failure originated the absence of specific prevention or the “second moment” of prevention; in other words, when the State was confronted by the disappearance of Claudina Velásquez; because, as there was no mechanism, instrument or practice for the immediate search for missing women (which should have existed owing to the State’s “general obligation of prevention”), this evidently influenced the actions of the State when it was informed that the victim was missing. 58. On this point, I consider that States must pay special attention to the general obligation of prevention in accordance with the requirements for this obligations established by the American Convention on Human Rights and the “Convention of Belém do Pará.” Thus, it is not sufficient for the State to take just any measure or action to comply with the obligation of prevention; rather, it must ensure that such measure or action effectively has the purpose of preventing, as of the first moment and in general, the specific danger that women and girls in the region may face. In sum, this represents a fundamental question to which the States should give special consideration in contexts of violence against women – as seen in the instant case – because the eradication of femicide and, in general, of violence against women, a social burden that regrettably continues to afflict the region, depends to a large extent on compliance with the said “obligation of prevention. Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot Judge Pablo Saavedra Alessandri Secretary 16