18 regard to said documents, together with the body of evidence, in application of the rules of sound judicial discretion. 48. In relation with the documents presented by the representatives in their written brief of final arguments, the State observed that the representatives “are attempting to rectify an aspect they omitted almost nine months ago in their brief of final arguments, which was time-barred and in contravention of the rules of the present contentious proceeding, information related to the cost of processing the matter since 2008.” Likewise, the State made observations on the merits regarding said documents (infra para. 283). 49. In regard to the documents noted in the prior paragraph, submitted by the representatives regarding costs and expenses, the Court will only consider those documents forwarded with the final written arguments that refer to new costs and expenses incurred due to the proceedings before this Court, namely, those incurred subsequent to the brief of pleadings and motions (infra para. 285). C. Assessment of the statements of the alleged victims and of the testimonial and expert evidence 50. Regarding the statements of the alleged victims and the witnesses, and the expert opinions provided during the public hearing and by means of sworn statements, the Court finds them pertinent only to the extent that they comply with the purpose defined by the President of the Court in the order requiring them (supra para. 28, 29, and 30), and in conjunction with the other elements of the body of evidence, taking into account the observations made by the parties.45 51. The Court observes that the State was two days late in presenting its observations on the affidavits sent to it on March 13, 2010. Nevertheless, given that the delay was minor and that its acceptance does not create a procedural imbalance that would prejudice the parties or affect legal certainty, the Court admits the State’s brief. 52. The State did not contest the testimony of the alleged victim, but it did note that said testimony alone cannot count as conclusive evidence, but rather that it must be considered as a part of all the evidence in the proceeding, given that the victim has a direct interest in the outcome of the litigation. The Court observes, in accordance with its jurisprudence, that the testimony rendered by the alleged victims cannot be assessed standing alone, but rather together with all the evidence of the proceeding,46 because they are useful in that they serve to provide more information regarding the alleged violations and their consequences. Taking the foregoing into account, the Court admits the testimony of Mrs. Rosendo Cantú, noting that its probative weight will be considered only insofar as it corresponds to the purpose defined by the President of the Court (supra para. 30), taking into account the entire body of evidence, the State’s observations, and the rules of sound judicial discretion. 53. In regards to the declarations of the witnesses and experts, the State expressed, in a general manner, that none was admitted with the purpose of proving that military personnel sexually abused Mrs. Rosendo Cantú. It noted that “[t]he testimonials, statements, and expert opinions that indicate that Mrs. […] Rosendo Cantú was raped by agents of the State should be dismissed because [the] Court did not admit them with said purpose in the sub judice proceeding. Moreover, in none of those cases were the 45 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of September 17, 1997. Series C No. 33, para. 43; Case of Chitay Nech et al., supra note 25, para. 56, and Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, supra note 25, para. 64. 46 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo, supra note 45, para. 43; Case of Chitay Nech et al., supra note 25, para. 56, and Case Manuel Cepeda Vargas, supra note 25, para. 65.