35 legal system.118 Its procedure, being one of an international tribunal, presents particularities and characteristics which pertain only to it, to which all the procedural elements of domestic courts do not automatically apply to it. International protection of human rights should not be confused with criminal justice.119 For the effects and purposes of the Judgment before this Court, the elements of proof that arise from the body of evidence are sufficient to derive the aforementioned conclusions. The standards or requirements of proof are not those of a criminal court, given that it is not the Court’s role to determine the individual responsibilities nor to assess, under that criteria, the same evidence. 106. Based on the aforementioned, the Court finds it proven that Mrs. Rosendo Cantú was a victim of acts that constitute rape, committed by two soldiers in the presence of six others at a stream near her home where she went to wash clothes (supra para. 73). D. Juridical classification of the facts related to the rape 107. Since the Court has found it proven that Mrs. Rosendo Cantú was the victim of acts of gender-based violence committed by agents of the State, it must decide how this should be classified from a juridical point of view. 108. The Court recalls, as indicated by the Convention of Belém do Pará, that violence against women constitutes not only a violation of human rights, but is “an offense against human dignity and a manifestation of the historically unequal power relations between women and men,” that “pervades every sector of society, regardless of class, race, or ethnic group, income, culture, level of education, age or religion, and strikes at its very foundation.”120 109. The Court, following international jurisprudence and taking into account the provisions of said Convention, has considered previously that sexual violence is committed by means of acts of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances against their will, and that in addition to involving physical invasion of the human body, they may include acts which do not involve penetration or even any physical contact.121 In particular, rape constitutes a paradigmatic form of violence against women, and its consequences go far beyond affecting the victim. 110. The Court will examine whether the facts of the present case are subsumed under the crime of torture, as affirmed by the Inter-American Commission and the representatives. As such, the Court recalls that, in Bueno Alves v. Argentina,122 pursuant to the definition established in the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, it understood that it is confronted with an act of torture when the mistreatment fulfills the following requirements: i) intentional; ii) causes severe physical or mental suffering, and iii) is committed with any objective or purpose. 118 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez. Merits, supra note 33, para. 135; Case of Escher et al., supra note 115, para. 128. 119 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez. Merits, supra note 33, para. 135; Case of Escher et al., supra note 115, para. 134. 120 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women. Preamble. 121 Cf. Case of Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Perú. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment November 25, 2006. Series C No. 160, para. 306. También ICTR, Case of Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu. Judgment of September 2, 1998. Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 688. 122 Cf. Case of Bueno Alves v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 11, 2007. Series C No. 164, para. 79.