2 are not present in generic requests to which proof or explanations are not attached has supported such denial.301 7. To my knowledge such position is correct in terms of assessing the amount for costs and expenses and in those cases in which the victims’ representatives or the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights request the implementation of a public policy or of specific programs which have already been applied by the State, and where these do not explain deficiencies on existing ones. 8. However, in cases of this nature, the Tribunal is competent to determine what could be an appropriate measure of reparation regarding the three cited instances, or for at least setting the standards that should be honored by those policies executed by the State in this regard. A Tribunal that applies standards of human rights issues cannot render a restrictive interpretation of the language in the Pact of San Jose, but can, as established on Article 29(c) of the American Convention and as the Court itself has established, apply the pro homine principle. 9. The aforementioned conclusion can be reached, even when the combination of the principles iura novit curia and pro homine are applied in interpreting human rights’ treaties. Such important decision, that of fixing the appropriate reparation for the victim, should not be left only to the diligence or lack of it, coming from the parties in the proceedings, because if the Inter-American Commission or the victims’ representatives fail to support their respective petitions, the victim should not be devoid of such measures. 10. I mention the principle iura novit curia because if international tribunals, regardless of what the parties establish, are competent to determine what Articles of the American Convention have been violated after analyzing the facts, the Tribunal is likewise competent to determine what the applicable reparations should be, even if neither of the parties has proposed it (or had not supported the request).302 The authority to establish the State’s international responsibility for the violation of any of the Articles in the American Convection, cannot be severed, thus the Tribunal has the last word on establishing reparations that would be effective in trying to return the victim to the status quo when Article 63(1) of the San Jose Pact is properly applied. 11. Furthermore, it could also be said “who can handle the greatest, can also handle the lesser.” It would be pointless if the Inter-American Court can indeed establish a State’s international responsibility for the violation of a certain Article, from the review of proven facts, regardless of the violations put forward by the Inter-American Commission and/or by the victim’s representatives, but not establish pertinent reparations for such violation. The Court could possibly reject such reparation measures, only based on arguments that the State has already proven implementation of identical or suitable measures to repair such a violation, and that the parties have not proven the mistake, but the Court can never reject them based on an argument that they were submitted in a generic fashion or without supporting argumentation. 301 Cf. Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. México. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, para. 493. 302 See, in regard to this principle, inter alia, Case of the “Mapiripan Masacre” v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 15, 2005. Series C No. 134, para. 57.