27 Convention; nevertheless, the authorities persisted in their failure to comply with international law. 80. The representative highlighted the fact that it was the State itself who unequivocally admitted the violation of Article 8(2)(h) when it noted, in the statement of the motives for the amendment of August of 2007, that “[the] special regulations for political officers set forth in Article 140 of the Constitution present a practical problem due to the absence of a recourse […]. Pursuant to this provision, a person found guilty of a crime has the right to have his conviction reviewed again by a higher tribunal, in accordance with the law.” Nevertheless, the representative indicated that the State cannot allege that Mr. Alibux voluntarily decided to not make use of this recourse, since the amendment to the regulation came four years after the November 5, 2003 conviction, as well as after the completion of the one-year term of imprisonment and after the completion of the three-year sentence of ineligibility to serve in the capacity of cabinet minister. Based on the foregoing, the representative concluded that the State violated the right to appeal the judgment stipulated in Article 8(2)(h) of the Convention. 81. The State argued that Article 140 of the Constitution provided that, with respect to the commission of crimes, political office holders, active or retired, would be prosecuted by the highest body charged with the administration of justice, to wit, the High Court of Justice. The State indicated that Article 140 was based on the idea that such officials hold a certain immunity, which the average citizen does not enjoy, due to the status that these authorities possess. The State signaled that the absence of the right to appeal the judgment was inherent within the scope of Article 140 of the Constitution and that Mr. Alibux had knowledge of such regulation when he took office as Minister and swore allegiance to the Constitution; in other words, he knew he could not appeal a decision rendered by the High Court of Justice. Likewise, the State argued that the absence of the right to appeal was inherent in the administration of justice offered by the highest court, and that the prosecution of high government officials in a first, and only, instance was not, per se, a violation of the generally accepted principle of the right to appeal the judgment. In support of such assertion, the State relied on the terms of Article 2, paragraph 2 of Protocol 7 of the ECHR, since this international instrument establishes a series of exceptions to the right to appeal the judgment, among them, cases in which the individual was convicted in the first instance by the highest tribunal. Moreover, the State argued that the right to appeal the judgment could be regulated by law because such regulation is not only permitted by Article 2 of Protocol 7, supra, but also by Article 14, paragraph 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 82. In addition, the State noted that, on August 27, 2007, an amendment to the IPOHA was introduced, which entered into force on August 28 of that same year. Article 12(a) of the Act established a process of appeal for current or past political officers who had been prosecuted for criminal offenses committed in the exercise of their functions, in accordance with Article 140 of the Constitution. Similarly, the State emphasized that the same article of the Act provided that the decision in the first instance would be adopted by the High Court, composed of three judges, and the appeal would be decided by a panel of five to nine judges different from those who heard the case in the first instance. The State argued that, based on such regulations, Mr. Alibux had the legitimate right to appeal the judgment of conviction handed down against him, since the August 27, 2007 amendment granted him a period of three months from the date of the reform coming into force to appeal said decision, despite it having been issued prior to the enactment of the regulation. The State, however, noted that “it was the decision of [Mr. Alibux] to not exercise the right provided to appeal the sentence pronounced against him.” In light of the foregoing, the State concluded