4 the Convention.12 In other words, the pro homini principle will not always be applicable with regard to this rule, especially the aspects of it that are regulated by the organs of protection themselves13 because, on the one hand, it is not truly a human right, but rather an obligation of the individual and, on the other, its eventual violation could prevent the opportune and prompt achievement of the aforementioned practical effect, which is, let me repeat, the re-establishment of respect for the human rights presumably violated by the State concerned. What said rule seeks, then, is, insofar as possible, to make recourse to the interAmerican jurisdiction unnecessary, by requiring that, in the first place, the respective State is called on directly to comply, if it has not already done so, with the international commitments that it has assumed in the area of human rights, and this, in less time than would be taken to obtain the same effect by the intervention of the inter-American System. Certainly, the Convention includes the logical exceptions to the general rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies. Thus, it indicates that it is not necessary to exhaust these remedies previously if the domestic legislation of the state concerned does not provide them; if access to them has been denied, or they have been exhausted or, lastly, if there has been unwarranted delay in the decision regarding their exercise. In other words, these exceptions can be argued in situations in which the said remedies are clearly inexistent, ineffective, useless or unavailable. Undoubtedly, the said exceptions provide the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies with the necessary flexibility in its application, by eliminating a strictly formal meaning and scope, especially, although not exclusively, in those cases in which, in the State concerned, the rule of law or the effective exercise of representative democracy is absent, or human rights are generally and systematically violated, or periodic, free and fair elections based on universal, secret suffrage are not held, or a multi-party system and political parties are inexistent, or the public powers are not separate and independent; in sum, when the provisions of the Inter-American Democratic Charter 14 are violated in the respective State. Nevertheless, it should be noted that this means that applying these exceptions as a regular or general practice could lead to annulling the rule in question and, consequently, to further delaying effective, prompt and final compliance by the State concerned, especially if it is a democracy, with its international obligation to respect and ensure respect for the human rights that have presumably been violated, which is the object and purpose of the Convention. 12 Art. 29 of the Convention: “Restrictions regarding Interpretation. No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as: (a) permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for herein; (b) restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party; (c) precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of government; or (d) excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature may have.” 13 organs. 14 Both the Court’s Rules of Procedure and those of the Commission have been approved by the said Adopted by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States by Resolution AG/RES 1 (XXVIII-E-1) at the first plenary session held on September 11, 2001, during its special session in Lima Peru.