6 that there is no record in the case documentation of whether other remedies, such as the remedy of reconsideration, were admissible before the same court. But, in addition to the foregoing, it should be considered that the said inexistence of the remedy of appeal, which was the grounds for what was decided in the Judgment in this regard, was not asserted or alleged in the initial petition lodged before the Commission, or even subsequently in the instant case. Thus neither the Commission nor the petitioner indicated during the proceedings what was decided in the Judgment and transcribed above. It should also be emphasized that the Judgment’s ruling on the preliminary objection concerning the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies was not made with regard to the State’s final decision, which therefore could not be amended or changed and which, consequently, could give rise to international responsibility, but rather with regard to a prior decision that was not final – the said interlocutory decision. Hence, the preliminary objection was rejected based on a decision of the State that, by its very nature, did not have the effects of res judicata and did not refer to the merits of the matter examined in the corresponding proceeding. The foregoing reveals that the Judgment deviates considerably from the meaning of the above-mentioned rule and, consequently, from the essential requirements or conditions for the petition in this case to be admitted by either the Commission or the Court. Indeed, to the contrary, it would seem that in order to decide as it did in the Judgment, the Court tacitly turns to the exception to the rule of the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies established in Article 46(2)(a) of the Convention: that is, the inexistence in the domestic legislation of the State of due process of law for the protection of the rights that had allegedly been violated or that the said remedies were not available or were not adequate, suitable, useful, effective and valid. However, if the contents of the Judgment could be interpreted in this way, it would be necessary to consider, first, that it was for the petitioner, rather than the Court, to assert this exception. This is even established in the Commission’s Rules of Procedure and, consequently, represents how the Commission interprets the corresponding provisions of the Convention.17 Therefore, it could be affirmed that, by rejecting the preliminary objection of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Judgment is inconsistent with the general principle of public law that it is only possible to do what the norm establishes, because it is evident that there is no norm that confers on the Court – nor has this been established in its Rules of Procedure, as, to the contrary, occurs in the case of the Commission – the authority to request that what has been required of it be amended and, above all, to make the amendment itself. 17 Article 28(8) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure: “Requirements for the Consideration of Petition”… “Petitions addressed to the Commission shall contain the following information: … Any steps taken to exhaust domestic remedies, or the impossibility of doing so as provided in Article 31 of these Rules of Procedure;” Art. 29(3) of these Rules: “Initial Processing”. …“If the petition does not meet the requirements of these Rules of Procedure, the Commission may request that the petitioner or his or her representative complete them in accordance with Article 26.2 of these Rules..”