2 25(1) of the Pact of San José itself, on the need for the existence of "a simple and prompt recourse" or “any other effective recourse” for "protection [of the person] against acts that violate the fundamental rights granted by the constitution, or the laws of the State or by this Convention.” The right to judicial protection that protects fundamental rights of a national or conventional nature is an integral element of the rights for the protection of these at the national level, having a significant effect on the control model of constitutionality and control for conformity with the Convention taken by States and its effectiveness. For this reason, judicial protection should be given independent treatment in order to better understand its scope. 6. In this sense, had the Inter-American Court developed this dimension of Article 25(1) of the American Convention, most likely it would have declared a violation of that provision autonomously, attempting not to subsume the consequences in the violation of Article 8(2)(h) as done in the Judgment3 declaring that the State did not violate Article 25, which in turn affects the reparations and just compensation to the victim,4 in terms of Article 63(1) of the Pact of San José.5 7. In this regard, it is true that there is interdependence and interrelation between the rights of the American Convention. In this case, particularly regarding the right to due process established in Article 8 (which the Pact of San José entitles "the Right to a Fair Trial") and the right to "judicial protection" established in Article 25, in that, in general, any recourse must be made with respect to the minimum guarantees of due process, and hence the interconnection between Articles 8 and 25, as established and developed by the InterAmerican Court’s jurisprudence. However, it cannot be forgotten that every right in the Pact of San José was envisioned as an autonomous right, with their own dimension and scope, allowing individualized interpretive developments, adding to the understanding and configuration of the essential core of every right to achieve greater protection of persons through regional standards, while at the same time these developments contribute by clarifying State obligations in order for them to be respected. 8. As such, I consider that in the case, the right to appeal the judgment to a higher court (Art. 8(2)(h)) could have been differentiated from the diverse right to a remedy that protects fundamental rights of national or conventional sources. This vision of the right to the guarantee of rights, as is literally laid down in Article 25 of the American Convention, plays the role of integrating the fundamental rights of national and conventional sources for their adequate protection in a model exercising control for conformity with the Convention. 9. In this case, the current Constitution of Suriname includes a Constitutional Court, which had not been established at the time of the facts (and which has still not been established), and thus the relevant recourses under its jurisdiction have not been developed, which obviously, generated legal uncertainty about the mechanism and the body that effectively protects the fundamental rights in regard to the proposals on constitutionality and control for conformity with the convention, which may have led the Inter-American Court to declare the failure to conform with the Convention by omission by 3 Para. 119 of the Judgment. 4 Para. 151 of the Judgment in regard to Article 25 notes: “In light of this, the Court will not order any measure of reparation in this regard.” 5 Article 63(1). If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party. (italics added)