circumstances, including the special relationship that the indigenous peoples have with their lands.201 157. Furthermore, the Court considers that the fact that the lands claimed are in the hands of private individuals does not constitute, per se, a sufficient reason to deny prima facie the indigenous claims.202 This would place the indigenous peoples in a vulnerable situation where the rights to individual property can prevail over the rights to communal property, 203 owing merely to the existence of titles in favor of the former, to the detriment of the latter, as in cases such as Tjang A Sjin v. Zaalman and Celientje Martina Joeroeja-Koewie and Others v. Suriname & Suriname Stone & Industries N.V. (supra paras. 62 to 64). 158. The foregoing does not mean that whenever there is a conflict between the territorial interests of the State or of private individuals and the territorial interests of the members of the indigenous communities, the latter prevail over the former. 204 Thus if, for objective, specific and justified reasons, the State is unable to take measures to return the traditional territory and the communal resources to the Kaliña and Lokono peoples205 - after the possibility of expropriating206 the property of third parties has been adequately assessed as indicated in this Judgment – the State may offer alternative lands of the same or greater size and quality or payment of fair compensation, or both, by mutual agreement with the peoples concerned207 (infra para. 281). 159. Notwithstanding the above, the State must establish, by mutual agreement with the Kaliña and Lokono peoples and the third parties, rules for peaceful and harmonious coexistence in the lands in questions, which respect the uses and customs of these peoples and ensure their access to the Marowijne River (infra para. 283). 160. Based on the above, the Court concludes that the State of Suriname was aware of the claims for restitution of lands of the Kaliña and Lokono peoples and continued to issue property titles and leases to private third parties, at least until 2013, despite these specific claims. Furthermore, the Court reiterates that the failure to delimit, demarcate and grant title in favor of the Kaliña and Lokono peoples, made it possible to continue issuing land titles, without these peoples having a domestic remedy that would allow them to achieve the protection of their rights. This violates the obligation to ensure the right protected by Article 21 of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof. 201 States must take into account that indigenous territorial rights encompass e a different and broader concept that is related to the collective right to survival as an organized people with control of their habitat as an essential condition for the reproduction of their culture, for their very survival, and to implement their life projects. The ownership of the land ensures that the members of the indigenous communities conserve their cultural heritage. Cf. Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community, supra, para. 146, and Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku, supra, paras. 145 and 146. 202 To the contrary, the right to restitution would be meaningless without providing a real possibility of recovering the traditional lands, and would merely involve relying on the willingness of the actual owners, forcing the indigenous peoples to accept alternative lands or monetary compensation. Cf. Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community, supra, para. 138, and Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community, supra, para. 310. 203 Cf. Case of the Saramaka People, supra, para. 173. 204 Cf. Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community, supra, para. 149. 205 Cf. Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community, supra, para. 149, and Case of the Garífuna Community of Punta Piedra and its members, supra, para. 325. 206 Cf. Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community, supra, para. 217, and Case of the Garífuna Community of Punta Piedra and its members, supra, para. 324. 207 Cf. Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community, supra, para. 149 and 151, and Case of the Garífuna Community of Punta Piedra and its members, supra, para. 325. 43