b) The FIDH affirmed that the State had violated the right to personal integrity protected in Article 5 of the Convention because “the sentences and the trials held against its clients” affected their personal integrity. It indicated that “[t]he pursuit, arrest and imprisonment” and, in the case of some of them, life in hiding, caused them “suffering and harm to their physical and moral integrity.” These effects on their integrity were based, among other factors, on “physical and psychological health problems” resulting from their “arrest during vast police raids,” their identification by the press, the political authorities and the Public Prosecution Service as dangerous terrorists,” the “detention conditions,” the distance of the prisons from their families and communities, and the financial difficulties of their families to be able to visit them, as well as the direct consequences of the deprivation of liberty on them and on the family dynamics and, in some cases, the “hunger strikes” carried out to “demand their release and the non-application of the Counter-terrorism Act.” The FIDH did not allege the violation of the right to the protection of the family. 369. The State did not submit specific arguments to contest these alleged violations. It merely indicated, in general, that it “rejected […] each and every one of the human rights violations attributed to it.” B) Considerations of the Court 1. 370. Right to freedom of thought and expression Article 13 of the Convention establishes the following: Article 13 Freedom of thought and expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice. 2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to ensure: a) respect for the rights or reputations of others; or b) the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals. 3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions. 4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence. 5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any other similar action against any person or group of persons on any grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin shall be considered as offenses punishable by law. 371. In its case law, the Court has referred to the broad content of the right to freedom of thought and expression established in Article 13 of the Convention. This norm protects the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds.361 The Court has indicated that freedom of expression has an individual dimension and a social dimension, based on which it 361 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13, 1985, para. 30; Case of Kimel v. Argentina, para. 53, and Case of Mémoli v. Argentina. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 22, 2013. Series C No. 265, para. 119. 126