verified, the intent of causing fear to the general population shall be presumed” when the offense is committed by using the means or devices indicated (including “explosive or incendiary devices”) entails a violation of the principle of legality and the principle of the presumption of innocence. 171. The Court reiterates that the codification of offenses means that the criminalized conduct is delimited as clearly and precisely as possible (supra para. 162). In this definition, the special intent or purpose of instilling “fear in the general population” is a fundamental element to distinguish conduct of a terrorist nature from conduct that is not, and without which the conduct would not meet the definition. The Court considers that the said presumption that this intent exists when certain objective elements exist (including “the fact of committing an offense with explosive or incendiary devices”) violates the principle of legality established in Article 9 of the Convention, and also the presumption of innocence established in Article 8(2) of this instrument. The principle of the presumption of innocence that, as the Court has determined, constitutes a cornerstone for judicial guarantees,180 signifies that judges should not commence the proceedings with a preconceived idea that the accused has committed the offense that he is charged with, so that the burden of proof rests on the accuser and not on the accused, and any doubt must be used to the benefit of the accused.181 The authoritative demonstration of guilt is an essential requirement for criminal punishment.182 172. In this regard, the State indicated that, with the 2010 amendment of Law No. 18,314, “the presumption of the intent to instill fear was eliminated” in order “to protect the principle of the presumption of innocence […,] so that […] any accusation of terrorism must be proved by the accuser and not, as before the amendment of the law, when those charged with such offenses had to disprove the presumption of terrorist intent.” Witness Acosta Sánchez, proposed by Chile, explained this amendment similarly, indicating during the public hearing that this presumption “to a great extent, infringed the principle of innocent until proved guilty.”183 Expert witness Scheinin,184 proposed by the Commission, the FIDH and CEJIL, gave a similar opinion, indicating that, in definitions of offenses, presumptions work to the detriment of the accused and invert the court’s reasoning that all the elements of the offense must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Expert witness Cancio Meliá, proposed by CEJIL, considered that this presumption “extend[ed] the scope of terrorism without any restriction, by […] inverting the burden of proof and establishing the […] principle that any act carried out with an incendiary device […] was, in principle, considered a terrorist act,” which, in his opinion, was “absolutely incompatible not only with the principle of legality, (because it makes […] it unpredictable to know when it would be considered that ‘the contrary has been proved’ – in other words, the absence of the intent [of instilling fear]), but also with the most elementary principles of due process of law.”185 Furthermore, expert witness Andreu-Guzmán, proposed by the FIDH, 180 Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits. Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 77, and Case of López Mendoza v. Venezuela. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 1, 2011. Series C No. 233, para. 128. 181 Cf. Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 26, 2010. Series C No. 220, para. 184, and Case of López Mendoza v. Venezuela, para. 128. 182 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111, para. 204, and Case of López Mendoza v. Venezuela, para. 128. 183 The said witness testified about “his participation” in the amendments to the Counter-terrorism Act in Chile and the process of adapting it to international standards. Cf. Statement made by witness Juan Domingo Acosta Sánchez before the Inter-American Court during the public hearing held on May 29 and 30, 2013. 184 Cf. Statement made by expert witness Martin Scheinin before the Inter-American Court during the public hearing held on May 29 and 30, 2013. 185 Cf. Affidavit prepared on May 21, 2013, by expert witness Manuel Cancio Meliá (file of statements of presumed victims, witnesses and expert witnesses, folio 161). 60