290. Consequently, the appeal for annulment available to Florencio Jaime Marileo Saravia, José Benicio Huenchunao Mariñán, Florencio Jaime Marileo Saravia, Juan Patricio Marileo and Juan Ciriaco Millacheo Licán and Patricia Roxana Troncoso Robles was not adapted to the basic requirements needed to comply with Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention, and thus their right to appeal a judgment convicting them was violated. * * * 291. Based on the above, the Court concludes that the State violated the right to appeal the judgment, established in Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) of this instrument, to the detriment of Segundo Aniceto Norín Catrimán, Pascual Huentequeo Pichún Paillalao, Juan Patricio Marileo Saravia, Florencio Jaime Marileo Saravia, José Benicio Huenchunao Mariñán and Juan Ciriaco Millacheo Licán and Patricia Roxana Troncoso Robles. 3. Obligation to adopt domestic legal provisions 292. The Court observes that the dispute concerning the legislative framework of the appeal for annulment is circumscribed to the grounds for this remedy established in the Criminal Procedural Code (supra paras. 263 to 266). Chile affirmed that, under Article 374.e) of this code, the factual aspects may be examined by a review of the assessment of the evidence made by the lower court, without this entailing the possibility of the higher court re-establishing the facts.310 Additionally, in its final arguments brief, the State also affirmed that the purpose of the grounds established in Article 373.b) is to ensure the correct application of the law and to permit “the review of factual aspects; for example, when the Court examines the facts that have already been proved and gives them a different legal classification.” For their part, the representatives understood that the grounds established in Article 374.e) of this code do not permit the review of “facts or factual presumptions of judgments,” and are limited to “legal aspects.” The Commission did not offer specific arguments on the compatibility of the grounds for the appeal for annulment with the right to appeal the judgment. 293. Regarding the State’s argument concerning article 373.b) of the Criminal Procedural Code, the Court observes that, under the said grounds for nullity, it is possible to contest the judgment based on “erroneous application of the law.” From an analysis of the text of this provision, the Court is unable to conclude that it meets the requirement of an effective remedy, because the way it is worded does not impose on the judge or court the obligation to make an analysis that would allow it to make a ruling on the arguments of the appellants about the assessment of the acts that those convicted were accused of, which constitutes the basic presumption for the criminal punishment imposed on them by the State. Even though these grounds could have indirect implications for the factual framework of the case, due to the interdependence that exists in the jurisdictional activity between the determination of the facts and the application of the law (supra para. 270.d), owing to the way the subparagraph is drafted, they do not ensure legal certainty to the person who is found guilty as regards the possibility of filing complaints about factual issues. 294. In relation to whether the grounds for nullity established in paragraph (e) of article 374 of the Criminal Procedural Code is consistent with the criterion of an effective remedy to which 310 It asserted that this subparagraph permits, “[i]n practice, a review of factual questions [by means of the] control of the assessment of the evidence and of the probative reasoning made by the lower court,” both by reading the judgments that transcribe the statements of witnesses and expert witnesses in their entirety, and by the possibility of presenting evidence of the grounds cited, which results in the “higher court, among other practices, listening to the audio recordings that constitute the official record of the hearing of the oral trial.” According to the State, the grounds established in Article 374.e) signify a “control of the probative reasoning,” in the sense of making an “opinion about the opinion,” rather than an “opinion about the fact,” particularly with regard to “the substantiation,” which “consists rather in a legal admonition relating to the absence of, or inadequate, substantiation of the facts, based among other provisions, on the rules of sound judicial discretion and the duty of the court to provide the reasoning for its decision, but with an evident relationship to the facts.” 101