Article 7. Right to Personal Liberty 1. Every person has the right to personal liberty and security. 2. No one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the reasons and under the conditions established beforehand by the constitution of the State Party concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto. 3. No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. […] 5. Any person detained shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to be released without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings. His release may be subject to guarantees to assure his appearance for trial. […] Article 8. Right to a Fair Trial […] 2. Every person accused of a criminal offense has the right to be presumed innocent so long as his guilt has not been proven according to law. […] 308. Thus, paragraph 1 of Article 7 establishes the right to personal liberty and security in general, and the other paragraphs establish specific aspects of this right. The violation of any of those paragraphs entails the violation of Article 7(1) of the Convention, “because the failure to respect the guarantees of the individual deprived of liberty results in the failure to protect this person’s right to liberty.”316 309. The general principle in this regard is that liberty is always the rule, and its limitation or restriction always the exception.317 This is the effect of Article 7(2), which stipulates that: “[n]o one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the reasons and under the conditions established beforehand by the constitution of the State Party concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto.” But mere compliance with the legal formalities is not sufficient, because Article 7(3) of the American Convention, by establishing that “[n]o one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment,” prohibits arrest or imprisonment by means that may be legal, but that, in practice, are unreasonable, unpredictable, or disproportionate.318 310. The application of this general principle to cases of pre-trial detention or custody arises from the combined effect of Articles 7(5) and 8(2). Based on these articles, the Court has established that the general rule must be the liberty of the accused while his criminal responsibility is being decided,319 because he enjoys a legal status of innocence and this requires that the State accord him a treatment in keeping with his situation of someone who has not been convicted. In exceptional cases, the State may resort to a measure of preventive incarceration in order to avoid situations that jeopardize achieving the objectives of the 316 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez. v. Ecuador, para. 54, and Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela, para. 116. 317 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez. v. Ecuador, para. 53; Case of Tibi v. Ecuador. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 7, 2004. Series C No. 114, para. 106, and Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela, para. 121. 318 Cf. Case of Gangaram Panday v. Suriname. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 21, 1994. Series C No. 16, para. 47, and Case of J. v. Peru, para.127. 319 Cf. Case of López Álvarez v. Honduras. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 1, 2006. Series C No. 141, para. 67, and Case of J. v. Peru, para.157. 109