taking other criteria into account that allowed him to assess the need for the measure in a specific case in order to achieve procedural objectives. However, the Court takes into account the clarification made by expert witness Duce to the effect that “the [Chilean] courts usually understand that the danger to the security of society will be constituted by the objective presence of one or some of [these] circumstances,” which is particularly serious if it is recalled that they include “the severity of the punishment assigned to the offense” and “the nature of the [offenses involved].” The Court reiterates that neither of these criteria are, in themselves, sufficient justification for pre-trial detention (supra para. 312.a) and adds that to base pre-trial detention solely on these criteria results in a violation of the presumption of innocence. Criteria of this nature must be assessed in the context of evaluating the need for the measure in the circumstances of the specific case. 363. By ordering and maintaining the measures of pre-trial detention of the eight victims in this case, the grounds of “danger to the security of society” was applied repeatedly in the way indicated by expert witness Duce, without justifying the need for the measure in the circumstances of the specific case, and based above all on criteria relating to the seriousness of the offense investigated and the severity of the punishment (supra paras. 321 to 327, 337 to 339 and 352). 364. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that article 363 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applied to Mr. Ancalaf and article 140.c of the Criminal Procedural Code of 2000 applied to the other seven presumed victims, which established the grounds for pre-trial detention concerning “danger to the security of society,” were not per se contrary to the American Convention, because they could be interpreted in a way that was consistent with it, provided that they were applied seeking a procedural objective and the criteria taken into account were assessed in relation to the evaluation of whether there was a procedural risk in the circumstances of the specific case. Consequently, Chile did not violate the obligation to adopt domestic legal provisions, established in Article 2 of the American Convention, in relation to Article 7 of the American Convention, to the detriment of the eight presumed victims of this case. The violation of their right to personal liberty resulted from the judicial interpretation and application of these norms. VII.4 – FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION, POLITICAL RIGHTS, AND RIGHTS TO PERSONAL INTEGRITY AND TO THE PROTECTION OF THE FAMILY (ARTICLES 13, 23, 5(1) AND 17 OF THE AMERICAN CONVENTION) 365. The alleged violations examined in this chapter are a result of the pre-trial detention and the main and ancillary punishments imposed on the presumed victims. The Court must determine whether these consequences have constituted autonomous violations of the American Convention. A) Arguments of the Commission and of the parties 366. The Commission affirmed that Chile violated the rights established in Articles 13 and 23 of the Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) of this instrument, to the detriment of the eight presumed victims owing to “the impact [of the] classification of an offense as a terrorist act” on “the imposition of the [ancillary] punishments […] which, owing to their content, affect the exercise of other rights recognized in Articles 5 and 17 of the Convention. 367. With regard to the alleged violations of the right to freedom of thought and expression and political rights, the common interveners submitted the following arguments: a) CEJIL indicated that the State had violated these rights to the detriment of Víctor Manuel Ancalaf Llaupe, in relation to Articles 1(1), 2 and 8 of this instrument. It affirmed that “punishments restricting freedom of expression […] are the result of a sentence 124