435. When determining that Chile had violated the right of the defense to examine witnesses, protected in Article 8(2)(f) of the Convention, to the detriment of Pascual Huentequeo Pichún Paillalao, the Court noted that witness protection measures consisting of their anonymity were adopted without effective judicial control (supra para. 249), and testimony obtained under these conditions was used decisively to justify the guilty verdict. Also, even though, in the criminal proceedings against Mr. Pichún Paillalao, the protection measure of witness anonymity was accompanied in specific cases with counterbalancing measures (supra para. 250), the failure to regulate the latter led to legal uncertainty regarding their adoption.422 436. The Court finds that, in the context of the Chilean laws applied in this case, it is appropriate to order Chile to regulate clearly and rigorously the procedural measure of witness protection consisting in anonymity in order to avoid violations such as those declared in this Judgment. It must ensure that this is an exceptional measures, subject to judicial control based on the principles of necessity and proportionality, and that this type of evidence is not used decisively to justify a guilty verdict, and must also regulate the corresponding counterbalancing measures which ensure that the impairment of the right of defense is sufficiently offset, as established in this Judgment (supra paras. 242 to 247). In addition, the Court recalls that, in order to ensure the right of the defense to examine witnesses, the judicial authorities must apply the criteria or standards established by the Court (supra paras. 242 to 247) in exercise of conventionality control. C) Compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage 437. In its case law the Court has established repeatedly that a judgment constitutes per se a form of reparation.423 Nevertheless, considering the circumstances of the case sub judice, the consequences of the violations committed for the victims, in the personal, family and community spheres, as well as the change in their living conditions following their deprivation of liberty, the Court also finds it pertinent to analyze the payment of compensation, established on the basis of equity, for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 438. The Commission asked the Court “[t]o award pecuniary and non-pecuniary reparation to the victims […] for the violations declared in the […] report.” 439. Regarding the request to compensate the pecuniary damage, the common interveners of the representatives of the victims submitted the following arguments: a) CEJIL indicated that “[t]he prosecution, arrest and subsequent sentencing for ‘terrorist’ acts of Werken Ancalaf affected the family’s production arrangements.” The community to which Víctor Manuel Ancalaf Llaupe and his family belonged “carried out agricultural and cattle-raising activities” with a “family-based form of production,” which was substantially affected by his deprivation of liberty, because “Víctor’s absence reduced the family’s participation in community production since he was unable to contribute to the workforce.” It also affirmed that this situation meant that Mr. Ancalaf Llaupe’s wife “not only had to take care of the children, […] but also had to try and occupy his role in the family and the community.” Taking into account that, “[a]t the time of his arrest, the surplus production that Víctor sold at the market was around 7,600 dollars a month, and that “he was deprived of liberty for four years and four 422 While, during the first trial, the identity of the anonymous witnesses was not revealed to either the accused or their defense, during the second trial – held owing to the annulment of the first one – the identity of these witnesses was revealed to the defense counsel with the express prohibition to communicate this information to their clients, which shows that the granting of this measure was subject to the criterion of the court that presided each trial. 423 Cf. Case of Neira Alegría et al. v. Peru. Reparations and costs. Judgment of September 19, 1996. Series C No. 29, para. 56, and Case of Liakat Ali Alibux v. Suriname, para. 147. 142