indicated that the presumption of article 1 of Law No. 18,314 “runs counter to the principle of the presumption of innocence, because it considers proved prima facie the specific criminal intent based merely on the use of certain means or weapons,” and that it is “a clear and deeply-rooted principle of contemporary criminal law that criminal intent, and a fortiori, specific criminal intent, is an element of the illegal conduct that must be proved and cannot be presumed.” In addition, he clarified that “the wording of article 1, by establishing presumptions of the intentionality (specific criminal intent), places the burden of proof on the accused to prove that he did not have the said intention.”186 173. The legal recognition of this presumption may have influenced the criteria used by the domestic courts to analyze and confirm the existence of intent during the criminal proceedings. This Court finds that it has been proved that the said presumption of the subjective element of the terrorist offense was applied in the judgments that decided the criminal responsibility of the eight presumed victims in this case: (a) to convict Messrs. Norín Catrimán and Pichún as perpetrators of the offense of threat of terrorist arson (supra para. 116); (b) to convict Messrs. Millacheo Licán and Huenchunao Mariñán, the Marileo Saravia brothers, and Ms. Troncoso Robles as perpetrators of the offense of terrorist arson (supra para. 128), and (c) to convict Mr. Ancalaf Llaupe as perpetrator of the terrorist act consisting in “[t]o place, send, activate, throw, detonate or fire bombs or explosive or incendiary devices of any type, weapons or devices of great destructive power, or with toxic, corrosive or infectious effects,” for acts during which, after forcing the driver to get out of his truck, a “lighted rag” was thrown at this vehicle (supra para. 149). 174. Consequently, the Court concludes that the application of the presumption of terrorist intent with regard to Segundo Aniceto Norín Catrimán, Pascual Huentequeo Pichún Paillalao, Florencio Jaime Marileo Saravia, José Benicio Huenchunao Mariñán, Juan Patricio Marileo Saravia, Juan Ciriaco Millacheo Licán, Patricia Roxana Troncoso Robles and Víctor Manuel Ancalaf Llaupe violated the principle of legality and the right to the presumption of innocence, established in Articles 9 and 8(2) of the American Convention, in relation to the obligation to respect and ensure rights, established in Article 1(1) of this instrument. 3. Obligation to adopt domestic legal provisions (Article 2 of the American Convention), in relation to the principle of legality (Article 9 of the Convention) and the right to the presumption of innocence (Article 8(2)) 175. Article 2 of the American Convention establishes the general obligation of States Parties to adapt their domestic law to the provisions of the Convention in order to ensure the rights recognized therein. The Court has established that this obligation entails the adoption of two types of measure. On the one hand, the elimination of laws and practices of any nature that result in a violation of the guarantees established in the Convention; on the other, the enactment of laws and the implementation of practices leading to the effective observance of those guarantees.187 176. The Court has concluded that, at the time of the events, a criminal norm included in the Counter-terrorism Act was in force that was contrary to the principle of legality and to the right to the presumption of innocence, as indicated in paragraphs 169 to 174. This norm was applied to the victims in this case in order to determine their criminal responsibility as perpetrators of offenses of a terrorist nature. 186 Cf. Affidavit prepared on May 27, 2013, by expert witness Federico Andreu-Guzmán (file of statements of presumed victims, witnesses and expert witnesses, folio 622). 187 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs, para. 207, and Case of Mendoza et al. v. Argentina. Preliminary objections, Merits and reparations. Judgment of May 14, 2013 Series C No. 260, para. 293. 61