177. Therefore, the Court concludes that Chile violated the obligation to adopt domestic legal provisions, established in Article 2 of the American Convention, in relation to Articles 9 (principle of legality) and 8(2) (right to the presumption of innocence) of this instrument, to the detriment of Víctor Manuel Ancalaf Llaupe, Segundo Aniceto Norín Catrimán, Pascual Huentequeo Pichún Paillalao, Juan Patricio Marileo Saravia, Florencio Jaime Marileo Saravia, José Benicio Huenchunao Mariñán, Juan Ciriaco Millacheo Licán and Patricia Roxana Troncoso Robles. 178. The Court does not find it necessary in this case to rule on the other alleged violations related to the subjective element of the offense,188 or on the arguments relating to the objective element of the definition of a terrorist offense,189 because it has already concluded that the presumption of the intention of instilling fear in the general population is incompatible with the Convention, and that this presumption was applied in the proceedings against the presumed victims in this case. 179. However, the Court emphasizes that the acts for which the victims in this case were tried and convicted did not entail harm to anyone’s physical integrity or life. The Court finds it relevant to point out that the offense of arson or threat of arson of which seven of the victims were convicted relates to conduct defined in article 476.3 of the Criminal Code (supra para. 159.b.i). In the Chilean Criminal Code, the definition of arson offenses to which the Counterterrorism Act refers (supra footnotes 163 and 164) includes different situations, ranked in order of importance according to the severity of the effects on different rights,190 and the one included in the said article 476.3 is among the least severe.191 Similarly, Víctor Manuel Ancalaf Llaupe was convicted as perpetrator of the offense established in article 2.4 of the Counter-terrorism 188 Regarding the alleged scope and lack of precision of the subjective element of the offense, and also the alternative text of the elements of the subjective aspect of the offense. 189 Regarding the insufficient gravity of the conducts considered criminal in article 2 of Law 18,314, and the lack of precision in the description of the actions defined as offenses of which the presumed victims were convicted (the offense of “terrorist arson” defined in article 2.1 of the Counter-terrorism Act in relation to article 476.3 of the Criminal Code, and the action described in article 2.4 of Law 18,314 – the relationship with the presumption of terrorist intent, on the one hand, and the alleged “imprecision” of the expression “incendiary devices,” on the other). 190 Art. 474. Anyone who sets fire to a building, railway train, boat or any other type of place, causing the death of one or more persons whose presence there could be anticipated, shall be punished with long-term rigorous imprisonment at the highest level to life imprisonment. The same penalty shall be imposed when the fire does not result in death but rather in mutilation of a major limb or serious injuries of those included in article 397.1. The penalties under this article shall be applied, respectively, at their lowest level if, as a result of explosions due to the fire, death or serious injuries are caused to persons who were at any distance from the place of the incident Art. 475. The arsonist shall be punished with medium-level long-term rigorous imprisonment to life imprisonment. 1. When the fire is set in inhabited buildings, train, boat or place or in which, at the time, there were one or more persons, provided that the accused could have anticipated this circumstance. 2. When the fire is set in merchant vessels loaded with explosive or inflammable objects, in warships, dockyards, shipyards, warehouses, factories or storage places for gunpowder or other explosive or inflammable substances, arsenals, repair shops, museums, libraries, archives, public offices or monuments or places similar to those listed. Art. 476. The punishment shall be long-term rigorous imprisonment at any of its levels: 1. For anyone who sets fire to a building destined to serve as a dwelling which was not inhabited at the time. 2. For anyone who, within a village, sets fire to any building or place, even if this was not normally destined to serve as a dwelling. 3. For anyone who sets fire to woods, standing crops, pastures, undergrowth, fences or plantations. 191 The conduct described in article 476.3 is differentiated from the other actions criminalized as arson by the Criminal Code owing to its subject matter and by not including the requirement that the fire produce a specific result. 62