they both complain about the following aspects: (a) violation of constitutional guarantees and international treaties; (b) certain formal errors they believe they see in the judgment; (c) they disagree that the facts that were considered proved constitute the offense of threats, and (d) that these threats are not of a terrorist nature.” It concluded that none of the foregoing was substantiated; hence, it could not be admitted. It added that “the evidence provided in the hearing on the appeals had no procedural significance that could change the decision.” Consequently, it rejected the appeals and declared that the appealed judgment “is not annulled.” 278. There is no evidence that, in any part of its verdict, the Second Chamber examined the facts of the case or the legal considerations regarding the definition of the offense to verify that the statements on which the appealed judgment was founded were based on convincing evidence and on correct legal analysis. It merely sought to analyze the internal coherence of the judgment, indicating that: […] The statements analyzed above were made by individuals linked directly to the facts or who knew about them for different reasons, and whose testimony is consistent with the expert opinions and documentary evidence incorporated during the hearing that constitute the background information and that, taken as a whole and freely assessed, lead to the conviction that the facts contained in the private and the prosecutor’s indictment have been proved beyond any reasonable doubt. […] It also indicated that: […] The standard of conviction beyond any reasonable doubt pertains to Anglo-Saxon law and not to that of continental Europe; thus, it is a novelty for the Chilean legal system. However, it is a useful concept, because it is sufficiently evolved and eliminates discussions regarding the degree of conviction required, revealing that is it not an absolute conviction, but one that excludes the most important doubts. Accordingly, the phrase of ‘sufficient conviction’ was replaced by the phrase of ‘beyond any reasonable doubt.’ (E. Pfeffer U. Código Procesal Penal, Anotado y Concordado, Editorial Jurídica of Chile, 2001, p. 340). […] On these grounds, it concluded that: […] it is not found that the judgment contested by the appeals fails to meet the requirements of paragraphs (c) and (d) of article 342 of the Criminal Procedural Code, because a clear, cogent and complete description of the facts can be appreciated, together with the reasons used to define each act legally, beyond any reasonable doubt. […] 279. It can be seen that, after making a descriptive reference to the facts that the Oral Criminal Trial Court considered proved, and to the opinion on how they were codified, and citing parts of the analysis of the evidence by the said court, the Second Chamber merely concluded the four lines indicated in paragraph 278. The Court has verified that the Second Chamber’s ruling did not make a comprehensive analysis to conclude that the guilty verdict met the legal requirements to consider that the facts had been proved, or of the legal grounds that supported their classification under the law. The simple description of the lower court’s arguments, without the higher court that decided the appeal setting out its own reasoning that would logically support the operative paragraphs of its decision, means that the latter did not comply with the requirement of an effective remedy protected by Article 8(2)(h) of the Convention, which establishes that the appellants’ complaints and disagreements must be decided; that is, that they have effective access to the two-stage judicial ruling (supra para. 270.d). These flaws make the guarantee protected by Article 8(2)(h) of the Convention illusory and prejudice the right of defense of anyone who has been criminally convicted. 280. The foregoing clearly reveals that the judgment of the Second Chamber did not make a comprehensive examination of the ruling appealed, because it did not analyze all the contested factual, evidentiary and legal issues on which the guilty verdict against Messrs. Norín Catrimán and Pichún Paillalao was based. This means that it did not take into account the interdependence that exists between the factual determinations and the application of the law, so that an erroneous determination of the facts entails an erroneous or incorrect application of the law. Consequently, the remedy of appeal for annulment available to Messrs. Norín Catrimán 98