subsequent liabilities must be sufficiently explicit to guarantee individuals a margin of certainty regarding the possible liability of their expressions. (...) I believe that the rules of the criminal code are excessively ambiguous and broad and do not clearly establish the components of the crime, because they do not specify the intent required of the active subject, allowing the subjectivity of the offended party to determine the existence of the crime. (...) There is a principle of legality with respect to the articles, but in this case they do not comply with the requirement of clarity because the criminal definitions applied were too broad and vague, making it impossible to anticipate the conduct. So, there is no correspondence with the principle of legality in the norms applied in this specific case. 74. The case law of the Inter-American Court has long been consolidated in the sense that the definitions of criminal law must not only be formulated prior to the criminal act, but also in an express, accurate and exhaustive manner, using precise and unequivocal terms that identify the criminalized conduct. 54 This requirement of certainty or principle of specificity is one of the corollaries of the principle of legality 55 in criminal law, also known by its Latin formulation nulla poena sine lege, coined by Anselm Von Feuerbach, who derived it from his theory of psychological coercion. In order for a penalty to fulfill the function of encouraging citizens not to commit crimes, it is necessary that they know in advance precisely what the criminal law prohibits. 56 However, the principle of legality is not limited to this teleological or consequentialist argument 57 - it also has a political-democratic basis, of a deontological nature: the executive and judicial powers are bound by abstract laws that protect the individual from the arbitrariness of the State. Moreover, restrictions on the freedom of citizens – such as criminal laws par excellence - should only be determined by the democratically empowered legislator. 58 Thus, the requirement of certainty, derived from the principle of legality, means that criminal law must be sufficiently clear and precise so that those involved can know and understand the prohibited conduct, guaranteeing them a margin of legal certainty as to the possible liability for their statements. In a State governed by the rule of law, the predictability and reliability of the exercise of state power in the criminal sphere are values linked to the principle of legality. This means that a judge must be able to extract from the criminal law reliable guidance for its application in a specific case, while citizens must be able to clearly visualize the limits of permissible behavior and the nature and severity of the sanction that awaits them if they infringe those limits. 59 54 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C. No. 111, §174; Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 2, 2008. Series C. No. 177, §63 and Case of Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 20, 2009. Series C No. 207, §55. 55 Beside the others: nulla peona sine lege scripta (prohibition of basing punishment on customary or natural law), praevia (prohibition of retroactivity), and stricta (prohibition of analogy). 56 Further references SCHÜNEMANN, Bernd. Nulla poena sine lege, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1978, p. 2; GRECO, Luis. Lo vivo y lo muerto en la teoría de la pena de Feuerbach, Madrid/Barcelona/Buenos Aires/São Paulo: Marcial Pons: 2015, p. 55. 57 For a critique of the purely teleological basis of the principle of legality, cf. GRECO, Luís. Conveniencia and respeto: sobre lo hipotético y lo categórico en la fundamentación del derecho penal, Indret 4/2010, p. 5 sbsq. 58 GARCIA PÉREZ, Octavio. El principio de legalidad y el valor de la jurisprudencia, Indret 4/2018, p. 8; ROXIN, Claus/GRECO, Luís. Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Band I, 5th ed., 2020, p. 219. 59 URBINA GIMENO, Iñigo Ortiz de, ¿Leyes taxativas interpretadas libérrimamente? Principio of legality and interpretation of the derecho penal”, in: MONTIEL, Juan Pablo (ed.). La crisis del principio de legalidad en el