another person are made through the media, the fines imposed are increased and the prison terms of the Criminal Code remain unchanged. 80. By establishing a more severe penalty for those who use the media, the Press Law punishes them more harshly for the same offenses than citizens who are not linked to newspapers or the media in general. 81. It is true that the same provision establishes that “political criticism” does not constitute slander, unless it has a specific intent, approximating the doctrine of real malice. 65 However, this exception allows broad discretion to attribute an animus injuriandi to any political criticism, which may nullify the effects of the aforementioned legal exemption. Hence the importance, analyzed at the beginning of this opinion, of adopting objective and clear criteria on the exceptions to the application of criminal law, in order to limit, to the extent possible, the scope of the judge’s interpretation. 82. It is also true that Article 30 of the same law, although it does not generally accept the exceptio veritatis argument, paves the way for it to be accepted by providing for the suspension of the proceedings or the acquittal of the accused when the speech is in defense of a real public interest or when the offended party performs public duties and the alleged accusation refers to facts related to the exercise of his office. Thus, although exceptionally, Chilean legislation establishes some important safeguards to protect speech of public interest. 83. However, even with such safeguards, the above provisions of the Chilean Press Law impose a harsher penalty on an activity pertaining to the exercise of freedom of the press, placing an excessive burden of proof on the accused to demonstrate not only the truthfulness of the facts but also the absence of a “manifest intent to injure.” They also contain unclear wording that may hinder the definition of speech of public interest in the exceptions regarding the illegality of the offense. 84. It could be argued that the intention of the legislator was to ensure a more rigorous criminal protection due to the greater scope of the damage to a person’s honor when it is perpetrated by the media. However, in practice, by instituting a more restrictive sanction solely and exclusively for exercising a basic human right, the law ends up causing a direct violation of the right to freedom of expression. This is why the legal protection afforded to those who use the media cannot be lessened, but, on the contrary, should be increased due to its collective importance in a democratic society. 66 85. Not surprisingly, Article 1 of the Chilean Press Law itself establishes that freedom of opinion and information, without prior censorship, constitutes a fundamental right of all persons. It also recognizes that people have the right to be informed about events of general interest. However, it not only criminalizes, but even punishes more severely statements made through the media. An obvious contradiction. 86. Therefore, there is no pressing social need –a term used previously by the InterAmerican Court- to justify the imposition of a more severe penalty for crimes against honor committed through the media. Nor did the investigation of this case 65 This doctrine has its origin in the case law of the United States Supreme Court, in the case of The New York Times v. Sullivan (376 U.S. 254 - 1964), which held that, in order for a public official to claim compensation for damage to his honor caused by defamatory statements, it is necessary to prove that said statements were made with actual malice, i.e. with knowledge of or indifference to the falsehood of the opinion or information disclosed. 66 Inter-American Court. Case of Moya Chacón et al. v. Costa Rica. Preliminary objections, merits reparations and costs. Judgment of May 23, 2022. Series C. No. 451. Concurring opinion of Judge Rodrigo Mudrovitsch, §6163.