94. Accordingly, the Commission concluded that the State violated the rights to strike and to work contained in Article 26 of the American Convention, in relation to the obligations established in Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof, to the detriment of the 65 alleged victims. 95. In his final arguments, the representative agreed with the Commission, considering that the State did not respect the right to strike and that the dismissals affected the alleged victims’ right to work. 96. The State argued that, according to the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, the recognition of the right to engage in strike action generally admits as possible exceptions only those that could be imposed on certain types of public servants and workers in essential services, in the strict sense of the term. It emphasized that all civil servants working in the Judicial Branch are considered as public servants who exercise functions on behalf of the State, and therefore their right to strike may be restricted or suspended. It further argued that, although Article 243 of the Labor Code concerning essential services that are subject to restrictions of the right to strike does not include the administration of justice, Article 4 (d) of the Law on Unionization and Strike Regulations for State Employees establishes that the administration of justice and its auxiliary institutions are essential public services. Thus, it considered that the restriction imposed on Judiciary workers to go on strike is legitimate and complies with international standards. It added that, as a compensatory measure, Article 4(e) of the Law of Unionization and Strike Regulations for State Employees establishes the possibility of workers resorting to conciliation and arbitration procedures in order to assert their labor claims. 97. Regarding the proportionality of the requirement of the vote of two-thirds of the workers for a strike to be declared lawful, it argued that this requirement was not applicable to employees of the Judiciary, since the latter could not go on strike, but had to resort directly to the aforementioned arbitration procedure. It pointed out that this requirement, established by Article 241(c) of the Labor Code, was reformed by means of Decree No. 13-2001, which reduced the voting requirement from two-thirds to half plus one. It claimed that this reform ensures that the declaration of strike legality is more accessible to workers. It added that, since 2016, a bill was submitted with a new reform to Article 241 of the Labor Code, further reducing the quorum required to declare a strike legal. 98. With respect to the right to work, the State reiterated that, as public officials in an essential service, the workers of the Judicial Branch were restricted in their access to strike action, for which reason they had to resort to compulsory arbitration as a compensatory measure. It indicated that arbitration is an expeditious, objective and impartial process that complies with the guidelines established by the Committee on Freedom of Association. However, the workers decided to hold a de facto and illegal strike, for which reason the sanction of dismissal was lawful and based on legal norms consistent with international standards. For all of the above reasons, the State considered that it was not responsible for the violation of Article 26 of the Convention in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 of the same instrument. B. Considerations of the Court 99. The Court will analyze the arguments presented by the parties and the Commission and to this end considers it pertinent to recall the content and scope of Article 26 of the Convention (1). It will then examine the right to strike (2) and its impact on the right to work in the specific case (3). B.1. General considerations regarding the content and scope of Article 26 of the American Convention 29