of workers. However, these conditions must be reasonable and must not affect, in any way, the essential content of the right to strike or the autonomy of trade union organizations. 131 119. In this case, the requirements for the legality of a strike by State workers were: 1) the exhaustion of direct negotiations; 2) that the strike be held for demands of an economic or social nature; 3) that it not affect essential services and 4) compliance with the legal requirements, in this case, with the provisions of Article 241 of the Labor Code in force at the time, which implied a minimum participation of at least two-thirds of the workers in the strike. The STOJ complied with the first requirements and, in order to comply with the provisions of the Labor Code, on February 16, 1996, it asked the competent judicial authority to order the General Labor Inspectorate to carry out the count. This request was granted. Despite the fact that the authorities rejected the various appeals attempted by the State against the decision to order the count (supra para. 41), it was never carried out. In fact, the Inspector General's Office consulted the First Chamber to determine whether the count should proceed, but on February 26, 1996, the First Chamber ordered the suspension of the count until the challenges were resolved. 132 In view of the material impossibility of complying with the legal requirements, the STOJ held a de facto strike from March 19 to April 2, 1996. 120. Thus, in the instant case, the declaration of illegality was linked to the fact that the STOJ did not comply with this requirement because the General Labor Inspectorate was unable to carry out the count. However, the count was not carried out for reasons beyond the Union’s control. It should be noted that, in this case, both the employer and the authorities in charge of implementing and verifying compliance with the requirements form part of the State. Although the Stateemployer had the right to oppose the decision to carry out the count of the strike participants ordered by the First Chamber and executed by the General Labor Inspectorate, it should be noted that, once the final decision rejecting these appeals was issued, the count was not carried out and the case moved directly to the consideration of the motion of illegality filed by the State-employer itself to have the strike declared illegal. Between the two decisions - the final decision on the count and the filing of the motion for the declaration of illegality - more than twenty days passed, during which time the count could have been carried out. 121. With regard to the excessive complexity and lengthy delays in the prior procedures required to exercise the right to strike, the ILO’s oversight bodies have stressed that the legal mechanisms for declaring a strike should not be so complex or cause such long delays that, in practice, it becomes impossible to carry out a lawful strike or that the action loses all its effectiveness. Similarly, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has brought to the attention of the States that the lengthy procedure required to declare a strike legal may constitute a restriction of the right recognized in Article 8(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 133 122. Given that more than two years had passed between the start of the dispute in 1994 and the strike action, during which time all attempts at direct negotiation with the State-employer failed, 134 it may be concluded that the only tool left to the workers was the strike, as a last resort. 131 Cf. Compilation of decisions of the Committee on Freedom of Association, supra, para. 789-790. Cf. Committee on Freedom of Association, Report 343, Case No. 2432, paragraph 1026; Report 346, Case No. 2488, paragraph 1331; Report 357, Case No. 2698, paragraph 225; Report 359, Case No. 2203, paragraph 524; Report 371, Case No. 2988, paragraph 850; and Report 375, Case No. 2871, paragraph 231. Cf. Ruling of the First Chamber of the Labor and Social Welfare Appeals Court in the context of Collective Dispute No. 730-94 of February 26, 1996 (evidence file, folios 41 and 41). 132 133 CESCR. Compilation of final observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (1989-2004). 134 In the results of the verification of the complaint filed by the STOJ, MINUGUA considered that “successive legal challenges and motions filed by the Attorney General’s Office and the Supreme Court of Justice prevent, in fact, the 35