PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ALBERTO PÉREZ PÉREZ 1. I fully agree with the fundamental parts of the judgment accepting the State’s partial acknowledgement of responsibility and determining that the State violated the rights to life and personal integrity, protection of honor and dignity, freedom of thought and expression, and freedom of association, as well as the political rights of Senator Manuel Cepeda Vargas; the rights to judicial guarantees and judicial protection of Senator Manuel Cepeda Vargas and his next of kin, and the rights to personal integrity and the protection of honor and dignity, and the right to movement and residence of Iván Cepeda Castro, María Cepeda Castro, Olga Navia Soto, Claudia Girón Ortiz, María Estella Cepeda Vargas, Ruth Cepeda Vargas, Gloria María Cepeda Vargas, Álvaro Cepeda Vargas and Cecilia Cepeda Vargas, in their respective circumstances. 2. I consider of particular importance the reaffirmation that it is incumbent on the Court, “in the exercise of its contentious jurisdiction, to examine the facts brought before it and to assess them in accordance with the evidence submitted by the parties” and, in “cases of serious violations of human rights, when examining the merits” to take into account “that, since they were committed in the context of massive and systematic or generalized attacks against one sector of the population, such violations can also be characterized or classified as crimes against humanity, in order to explain clearly the extent of the State’s responsibility under the Convention in the specific case, together with the [pertinent] juridical consequences.” Thus, the Convention is interpreted “through [its] convergence with other norms of international law, particularly with regard to the prohibition of crimes against humanity, which is ius cogens,” without this implying “establish[ing] individual responsibilities, determination of which falls within the jurisdiction of the domestic or the international criminal courts” (paras. 41 and 42). 3. I also agree with almost all the measures ordered in the judgment in relation to the violations that have been verified. 4. I dissent exclusively with regard to the decision of the majority of the members of the Court not to grant, as compensation for loss of earnings, any amount additional to the sum awarded by the Colombian State solely to Olga Navia Soto (common-law wife of Senator Manuel Cepeda Vargas at the time of his death) and, thus, to deprive of any compensation for this concept all the other people considered “injured parties”; namely, “Iván Cepeda Castro, María Cepeda Castro, […] Claudia Girón Ortiz, María Estella Cepeda Vargas, Ruth Cepeda Vargas, Gloria María Cepeda Vargas, Álvaro Cepeda Vargas and Cecilia Cepeda Vargas (deceased)” (para. 212, which nevertheless states that “[a]ll of them shall be beneficiaries of the reparations ordered by this Court”). 5. This decision arises from the contents of paragraph 246 of the judgment, which reads as follows: The Court considers that, when national mechanisms exist to determine forms of reparations, these procedures and results can be assessed (supra para. 139). If these mechanisms do not satisfy criteria of objectivity, reasonableness and effectiveness to make adequate reparation for the violations of rights recognized in the Convention that have been declared by this Court, it is for the Court, in exercise of its subsidiary and complementary competence, to order the pertinent reparations. In this regard, it has been determined that the next of kin of