- 31 - 83. In this regard, the State alleged the existence of several different public versions issuing from different sectors of the country (“the media, […] journalists, authors, professors, non-governmental organizations, and the illegal armed groups themselves”), regarding the origins and actions of the UP, to which Senator Cepeda Vargas belonged. The State affirmed that certain sectors of the population believed that the PCC was “a party that was not exclusively dedicated to political activities, but rather a party that carried out [this activity] in order to strengthen the revolutionary armed struggle, particularly of the FARC.” In addition, it indicated that this situation resulted in an ideological ambiguity in the perception of the UP that, added to the Party’s application of the thesis of “the combination of all forms of struggle,” its origins in the Uribe agreements, and the military activities of the FARC-EP, “necessarily placed it in a vulnerable situation.” 84. In this case, it is not for the Court to determine whether or not there was a connection between Senator Cepeda and the FARC and, especially, between that group and the PCC or the UP. If public officials possessed reliable information that linked Manuel Cepeda and other members of the UP to illegal activities, they could have informed the corresponding judicial authorities.106 85. From 1987 to 1993, prominent public officials made statements that linked the UP and the PCC to the FARC, a group that, in turn, was linked to illegal activities.107 Even though there is no specific or direct reference to Senator Cepeda Vargas in these statements,108 at a time when the UP and the PCC were considered the “internal enemy” under the “national security” doctrine,109 they placed the members of the UP in a position of greater vulnerability and increased the level of risk they faced. 106 Cf., similarly, Tristán Donoso v. Panama. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 27, 2009. Series C No. 193, para. 81. 107 A newspaper article provided by the Commission reveals that the Commander of the Armed Forces stated that “the PCC depended on payments provided by the FARC” (Cf., newspaper article that appeared in “El Tiempo” on September 19, 1993, entitled “Por qué el optimismo de los militares?” [Why is the Army optimistic?] p. 19A. evidence file, tome IV, attachment 44 to the application, folios 2062 to 2063). In this regard, the State responded in these proceedings that “there were real indications that led both the Commander of the [Armed Forces], and civil society and the community in general to fear the regrettable existence of connections [between the FARC and the UP and the PCC.]” (evidence file, tome II, appendix III to the application, folio 829). In addition, the following statements by public officials are included in the body of evidence: (1) in September 1987, General Fernando Landazabal Reyes, Minister of the Interior told the weekly magazine Semana, “[a]nd you must be well aware that the FARC-EP were the armed branch of the Communist Party and that, today, the Communist Party is called UP”; (evidence file, tome XXII, attachment 18 to the final arguments brief of the representatives, folios 9204 to 9205); (2) on October 27, 1988, as a result of an attack on the UP offices in the municipality of Apartadó in Urabá, Antioquía, the Minister of Defense, General Rafael Samudio Molina, told the media that: “They obviously kept explosives in their offices”; (evidence file, tome V, attachment 12 to the brief with pleadings, motions and evidence, folio 2240); and (3) on March 19, 1990, the Minister of the Interior, Carlos Lemos Simmonds, stated during a debate in the Senate that, “in the elections of March 11, the country voted against the violence and defeated the political arm of the FARC: the Patriotic Union” (evidence file, tome V, attachment 11 to the brief with pleadings, motions and evidence, folio 2236). 108 Of the newspaper articles provided, only two refer more obviously to Senator Cepeda. Cf. an article that appeared in “El Espectador” on August 14, 1994, entitled “Jurassic’s paranoia”, p. 6A (evidence file, tome IV, attachment 44 to the application, folio 2060) and an article that appeared in “El Tiempo” on September 19, 1993, entitled “¿Por qué el optimismo de los militares?” p. 19A (evidence file, tome IV, attachment 44 to the application, folios 2062 to 2063). 109 Similarly, according to the United Nations Rapporteurs on torture and extrajudicial executions, the PCC was considered the “internal enemy” under the “National Security” doctrine, which was invoked by the Army as justification for its counterinsurgency efforts at the time. (Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye, para. 46, supra note, 87, folio 1127). Expert witness Andreu stated that “[t]he concept of the “internal enemy” under the national security doctrine, which was employed by the Colombian Armed Forces, went well beyond the spectrum of the guerrilla groups and extended to any type of political or social opposition and any type of dissidence. […] Since its creation, senior military leaders regarded the Patriotic Union as an ‘internal enemy’