- 34 - Directorate of the [UP] and of the [CPP], and of the Director of the weekly publication Voz, Carlos Lozano Guillén, owing to the constant death threats against them.”121 In addition, this murder caused Senator Cepeda Vargas and other leaders of the PCC and the UP to address themselves to the Minister of Defense122 and they also sent letters to the Attorney General of the Nation, the Ombudsman and the Prosecutor General of the Nation123 in order to again denounce the said plan and to indicate that execution of the plan had started with the said murder. In these letters, they also advised that they had received threats in relation to the “plan” at the offices of both the PCC Central Committee and the weekly publication Voz. 94. As confirmed by the Attorney General’s office, Aida Abella requested the office of the Secretary of the Bogotá District Government to provide protection to Senator Manuel Cepeda and other UP leaders on December 2, 1993. There was no response to this request until August 26, 1994, and then only because Mrs. Abella reiterated the request several times following Senator’s Cepeda’s murder. The Attorney General’s office indicated that the Government Secretary should have responded to requests for safety mechanisms.124 95. The State denied the existence of the so-called “coup de grâce plan.” It argued that the only evidence for it was the statements of the members of the PCC and the UP, who “unfortunately never indicated how they found out about the plan [or], at least, [the identity of] the presumed authors.” It considered that it was illogical to think that there was a State extermination plan while State authorities were taking measures to protect the rights of the members of the UP, and grant it guarantees as a political party in order to counter the different sources of violence that affected and threatened it. In particular, the State alleged that, following the Commission’s request for precautionary measures, and their subsequent expansion, it had put in place specific measures to protect the leaders, 125 although it did not mention Senator Cepeda among the beneficiaries of this protection. 121 Letter addressed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, on December 21, 1993 (evidence file, tome III, attachment 26 to the application, folios 1410 to 1411). 122 Letter from the Director of the weekly publication Voz to the Minister of Defense of November 26, 1993, supra note 68, folios 1403 to 1404. 123 Cf. letters addressed by Manuel Cepeda Vargas, Hernán Motta Motta and Ovidio Marulanda Sierra to the then Attorney General of the Nation, dated November 29, 1993 (evidence file, tome III, attachment 20 to the application, folios 1394 to 1395); to the then Ombudsman, dated November 29, 1993 (evidence file, tome III, attachment 21 to the application, folios 1397 to 1398), and to the then Prosecutor General of the Nation, dated November 29, 1993 (evidence file, tome III, attachment 22 to the application, folios 1400 to 1401). Also, see the letter of the Director of the weekly publication Voz to the Minister of Defense of November 26, 1993, supra note 68, folios 1403 to 1404. 124 Cf. decision issued by the office of the Second District Attorney of Santafé de Bogotá in case No. 1436444/96 in 1999, supra note 81, folios 1461 to 1486. 125 It indicated that meetings had been held with leaders of both parties, during which the leaders of the PCC acknowledged that the National Police had provided surveillance at the party’s headquarters, but the agent responsible for providing this had been murdered. It indicated that an agreement had been reached with the Minister of Defense, the Director General of the National Police and the National Director of the DAS establishing that personal protection for the UP and the PCC leaders would be provided by the National Police. In addition, following a meeting held with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 31, 1994, and after analyzing the requirements listed by the PCC and the UP spokesmen, the DAS Director of Security and Protection and the Head of Security for Presidential Pre-candidates were ordered to coordinate with a UP leader in order to assess the situations of risk of each leader and the protection that each leader required. It indicated that, consequently, a special protection service had been provided to the offices of the weekly publication Voz and the Central Committee of the PCC and that, by February 1994, the National Police was providing a specific protection service to some UP and PCC leaders.