18 events that occurred on April 11 and 12 and to undertake the necessary diplomatic negotiations to promote the prompt normalization of the democratic institutional framework.57 54. In compliance with the above, the Secretary General prepared a report on the situation in Venezuela, in which he recommended, inter alia, that the OAS should be at the disposal of the government and people of Venezuela to ensure that those events were never repeated. 58 In his report, the OAS Secretary General considered it opportune to examine aspects of the institutional framework of Venezuela in light of the provisions of the Democratic Charter. For example, he asserted that whatever agreement was reached between the different sectors of Venezuelan society should, as that Charter indicates, fully respect freedom of expression and therefore of the press. Also, that, as established in Article 4 of that international instrument, it was essential to re-establish complete confidence in the rule of law. b) Conduct of the media 55. RCTV has been named by senior Venezuelan officials as one of the private television stations that were active political participants in the events surrounding the coup d’état of April 2002.59 In particular, RCTV has been accused of openly supporting the strike that took place at the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002 by presenting propaganda in favor of the resignation of President Chávez during its paid publicity spots.60 Also, RCTV and other domestic television channels were accused of giving extensive coverage to the opposition marches and the swearing in of Pedro Carmona on April 11 and 12, 2002, and of failing to transmit the marches and protests in favor of the President and the reinstatement in the presidency of Hugo Chávez on April 13 and 14, 2002.61 In this regard, the Inter-American Commission indicated that it:62 “notes the bias found in some Venezuelan media outlets, which reflects the extreme polarization that characterizes the country. As one example of this, at the end of its visit, the Commission stated that: ‘The IACHR has been concerned by the scant information, or at times total lack of information, available to Venezuelan society during the days of the institutional crisis of April. Although there may be any number of justifications to explain this lack of information, to the extent that the suppression of information resulted from politically-motivated editorial decisions, this should be the subject of an essential process of reflection by the Venezuelan media about their role at that moment.’” 56. Similarly, the Human Rights Center of the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello indicated in its report entitled “Entre el estruendo y el silencio. La crisis de abril y el derecho a la libertad de expresión e información” that, during the coup d’état of April 2002 “the main private CP/RES. 811 (1315/02). “Situation in Venezuela.” http://www.oas.org/XXXIIGA/english/docs_en/resolucion_ venezuela.htm. 57 Report of the OAS Secretary General pursuant to Resolution CP/RES.811 (1315/02). Situation in Venezuela. http://www.oas.org/XXXIIGA/english/docs_en/report_venezuela.htm. 58 Cf. IACHR. Report on the situation of human rights in Venezuela 2003, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118. Doc. 4 rev.1, October 24, 2003, paras. 79, 81, 372 and 373. 59 Cf. Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA). “Reunión de alto nivel en Venezuela concluye con magros resultados,” [High-level meeting in Venezuela concludes with meagre results] Washington, DC, March 10, 2003; cited in the RCTV White Paper. Venezuela: March 2007, 1st edition (evidence file, folios 3314, 3315 and 3319). Also, during the general strike between December 2002 and February 2003, “the private television networks [including RCTV] bombarded viewers with coverage of the marches and carried opposition political messages free of charge in place of commercial advertising.” Cf. Human Rights Watch “Caught in the crossfire. Freedom of expression in Venezuela,” May 2003. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/05/20/caught-crossfire/freedom-expression-venezuela. 60 Cf. IACHR, Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela, 2009, Available at: http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Venezuela2009eng/VE09.TOC.eng.htm. It has also been recognized that “the Venezuelan population was kept with a total lack of information from hours before the coup d’état, and this continued, in practice, until the Monday [when Hugo Chávez was reinstated in the Presidency].” Cf. Equipo Nizkor – Derechos Human Rights “El fallido golpe de estado en Venezuela sirve para dejar en evidencia a la “diplomacia del estado de excepción,” p. 4 Available at: http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/venezuela/doc/nizkorven1.html 61 62 IACHR, Informe Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela, 2009, para. 358.