92 317. The Court notes that, when declaring the application inadmissible, the Supreme Court of Justice based its decision on the fact that domestic law establishes that, as the applicants could avail themselves of the ordinary procedure by using the administrative remedy seeking nullification against the administrative acts, it was not admissible to use the constitutional remedy of amparo. In this regard, the Court points out that the applicants filed the said appeal for nullification together with the application for amparo, and this was decided before the closure of RCTV took place (supra para. 105). Furthermore, the Court notes that the applicants amended their original application for amparo and included new requests (supra para. 104). Bearing in mind these three factors, the Court considers that, although the Supreme Court of Justice delayed slightly more than three months to rule on the application for constitutional amparo, this period was not excessive for deciding the application, and did not influence its effectiveness, particularly since its inadmissibility was based on the requirement that the appropriate remedy should be used against the administrative decisions contained in Communication No. 0424 and Resolution No. 002 prior to making an application for amparo. In addition, it cannot be considered that the ruling on this application for amparo permitted the consummation of the violation, because it was not the appropriate remedy to file against the said administrative decisions, since the appeal for nullification together with a request for protection had been filed on April 17, 2007, and the request was decided before the closure. 318. Consequently, the Court concludes that the decision on the application for constitutional amparo did not violate the right to a simple and prompt recourse of the RCTV shareholders, executives and employees, presumed victims in this case, established in Article 25(1), in relation to Article 1(1) of the American Convention. B.2. Injunction request B.2.1. Arguments of the Commission and of the parties 319. The Commission indicated that it had not found a lack of impartiality of the PoliticalAdministrative Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in the decision to reject this request. The Commission indicated that although that Chamber had declared that “non-renewal of the frequency in no way implies a supposed violation of that right [to freedom of expression], since the provisional protection of freedom of expression was requested, […] it was inevitable – or at least predictable – that the court would take a position on a matter related to the merits of the appeal for nullification.” The Commission also argued that “notwithstanding the importance of meeting the legally-prescribed deadlines, the delay of more than one month in deciding the injunction request did not prejudice the [presumed] victims’ access to justice, given that it was decided before the event it was meant to prevent, that is RCTV being removed from the air.” 320. The representatives indicated that the requests for an injunction and for unspecified interim measure were processed “negligently and with a notorious delay, even though, due to their nature, they required an urgent ruling; [and] this delay and this paralysis evidently violated the right to judicial protection and due process.” Specifically, with regard to the injunction, the representatives argued that “the Political-Administrative Chamber “had three working days [to decide the injunction request]; however, the Chamber issued its decision on May 23, 2007, one month after the protection had been requested, […] and this […] was inadmissible.’” They argued that “the unjustified delays by the Judiciary” entailed “the consummation of irreparable harm to [the presumed victims].” They indicated that the right to an effective recourse contained in Article 25 of the Convention had been violated, because the arguments presented by RCTV had been ignored arbitrarily and as part of the State policy […] to punish RCTV and prevent it from imparting information.”