Inter-American system, as well as the recognition of the inefficiency of the judicial system of human rights. This circumstance cannot function as a justification in the present issue, as it is primarily a political in nature rather than judicial, though it belongs to the judicial sphere. IV.- Responsibilities. Additionally, it is not appropriate to invoke this circumstance, given that it would be assuming that the topic of compliance with judgments is exclusively the responsibility of the Court, and not the States. Namely, that the inefficiency of the judicial system of human rights in this regard is a matter to be resolved by the Court, and not by the States. However, the provisions of Article 65 of the Convention and 30 of the Statute of the Court have as their object, precisely the opposite: that the General Assembly of the OAS, that is, the States, officially recognize and consequently assume the problem of noncompliance, in some cases, of judgments of the Court, and adopt the appropriate measures, if they so deem it necessary. And it is the sovereign States that have assumed the obligation provided for in Article 68(1) of the Convention. The problem is, then, their responsibility, as well as the task of solving it. That is the system established in the Convention and, as such, the Court should not impede its normal functioning, but rather, allow for it to operate effectively. What follows, therefore, is to permit the institutionality provided for in the Convention to function as planned. Likewise, it would be unacceptable, in order to justify the failure to inform the General Assembly of the OAS, as in the present case, of the noncompliance with judgments, to cite the fact that the Court has set a precedent, constant and uniform, in this regard. It is, as it has been described on other occasions13, not just that the Court is unable to modify the provisions of the Convention, but also that its jurisprudence does not create law,14 is not binding outside of the case being heard,15 and obviously can be modified by the Court itself, there being no impediment to this, except for the eventual inclination it might adopt in favor of a conservative stance on the matter. Also, it is not appropriate to invoke respect for human rights or the pro homine16 principle as justification for the indefinite extension, as has occurred in the present 13 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi regarding the Judgment of the Inter-American Court on Merits, Reparation, and Costs, Case of Barbani Duarte et al. v. Uruguay, of October 13, 2011, III. General Considerations. 14 Art. 38(1)(d). of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: “1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: …d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.” 15 Art. 59 idem: “The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” 16  Art. 29 of the Convention: “Restrictions Regarding Interpretation.   6