the alleged violation,196 ordered reasonable reparations,197 or exercised an adequate control of conformity with the Convention.198 144. In other words, although the system has two organs “competent to hear matters related to compliance with the commitments made by the States Parties to the Convention,”199 the Court can only “hear a case” following “the exhaustion of the procedure established in Articles 48 to 50” of the said instrument: that is the procedure of individual petitions before the Inter-American Commission. Thus, it is only if a case has not been settled at the domestic level, as corresponds in the first place to any State Party to the Convention in effective exercise of control of conformity with the Convention, that the case can be lodged before the system; in which case, it must be decided before the Commission and only if the latter’s recommendations have not been met can the case reach the Court. In this way, the logical and adequate functioning of the inter-American human rights system implies that, as a “system,” the parties must present their positions and information on the facts coherently and in keeping with the principles of good faith and legal certainty, in order to permit an adequate substantiation of the cases for the other parties and the inter-American organs. The position assumed by the State in the proceedings before the Commission also determines, to a great extent, the position of the presumed victims, their next of kin or their representatives, which then affects the course of the proceedings.200 145. It is precisely based on this need for coherence in the presentation of the facts and arguments that, once the Commission has submitted a contentious case to the Court, the Merits Report (and previously the application) determines the factual framework of the proceedings201 and 196 In the case of Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia, the Commission had asked the Court to declare that the State was responsible for the violation of the right to protection of honor and dignity of the next of kin, because declarations made against them by senior State officials constituted “acts of stigmatization” that affected them “and the memory of the Senator.” The alleged violation of Article 11 was also based on a specific act against the Senator’s son: a publicity message issued as part of the electoral publicity of the re-election campaign of the then candidate for the Presidency of the Republic. The Court observed that the Constitutional Court of Colombia itself had delivered a judgment in which it recognized that the dissemination of certain messages in the mass media harmed the good name and honor of Iván Cepeda Castro, as a son of one of the victims of the political violence in the country and that the said right had also been violated to the detriment of his next of kin. The Court declared that it “had analyzed the said judgment of the Constitutional Court, in the sense that it declared the [said] violation […] owing to the above-mentioned publicity message and that it had also established pertinent reparations at the domestic level.” Case of Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia, paras. 203 to 210. 197 In the same case of Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia, with regard to reparations and the rulings in the domestic contentious-administrative jurisdiction. Case of Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia, paras. 211 and ff. 198 Thus, in the case of Gelman v. Uruguay, the Court considered that the Uruguayan Supreme Court of Justice had exercised, in another case, an adequate control of conformity with the Convention in relation to the Amnesty Law, by declaring it unconstitutional. Case of Gelman v. Uruguay, para. 239. 199 Article 33 of the American Convention. 200 Similarly, in the case of Acevedo Jaramillo et al. v. Peru, the Court considered: 174. First, the Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the processing of each individual complaint seeking a jurisdictional decision by the Court requires the protection system established by the American Convention to work as an institutional whole. Before a contentious case can be brought before the Court alleging human rights violations by a State Party who has recognized the Court’s contentious jurisdiction, a proceeding must be instituted before the Commission, which starts by filing a petition with the Commission. The proceeding before the Commission provides for safeguards both for the respondent governement and for the alleged victims, their next of kin or their representatives, among which safeguards it is worth underscoring those concerning the requirements for the admissiblity of the petition and those concerning the principles of adversary procedure, procedural equality and juridical certainty. It is during the proceeding before the Commission when the respondent State initially submits the information, allegations and evidence it deems relevant to the petition, and the evidence rendered in adversarial procedure may later be put on the record of the case before the Court. The position taken up by the State in the proceeding before the Commission also determines to a large extent the position of the alleged victims, their next of kin or their representatives, which in turn affects the course of the proceeding […].” Case of Acevedo Jaramillo et al. v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, Judgment of February 7, 2006, Series C No. 144, para. 167 and ff. See also: Matter of Viviana Gallardo et al. Series A No. G 101/81, Considering paragraphs 12(b), 16, 20, 21 and 22, and Control of Legality in the Exercise of the Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Arts. 41 and 44 of the American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-19/05 of November 28, 2005. Series A No. 19, paras. 25 to 27. 201 Cf. Case of “Five Pensioners” v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 28, 2003. Series C No. 98, para. 153, and Case of Barbani Duarte et al. v. Uruguay. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 13, 2011. Series C No. 234, para. 36. ‐ 42 ‐