impact of each of the AN-M41A1 bombs of which it is composed.321 Likewise, the Court cannot fail to note that the technical report on the said tests specifies that, when carrying out the ballistic tests with the AN-M1A2 devices, a point “for safe observation” had been located 250 meters from the anticipated point of impact” of the bombs. 322 218. Regarding the imprecision of the weapon used, it should also be added that, as the 12th Criminal Court 12 observed in its first instance judgment, there is no certainty that the technician responsible for launching the device had visual contact with the village before he activated the device that freed the cluster bomb, and the evidence even allows the contrary to be presumed.323 Indeed, as can be inferred from the judgment, the position occupied by the technician in order to fulfill his functions, made it impossible – in view of his location in the aircraft cabin – for him to visualize the objective indicated, contrary to the pilot and co-pilot, who could view the area. This allowed the 12th Criminal Court to conclude that the aircraft technician who carried out the launch did not see the village before he did so.324 219. Similarly, it is worth recalling, as did the first instance judgment of the 12th Criminal Court of the Bogotá Circuit, that the commander of the Apiay Base himself indicated, referring to the ANM1A2 device, that “each cluster bomb […] can have a theoretical range of action of 150 meters depending on dispersion” and that “owing to the location very near the highway and residential area, it does not offer the necessary safety for this type of test,” thereby explaining why the ballistic test planned for the year 2000 was not carried out.325 220. In addition, the Court notes that the 12th Criminal Court referred to the Colombian Air Force manuals and regulations in force on December 13, 1998, which the aircraft pilots “were obligatorily […] aware of.”326 In particular, it referred to the norms that regulated aerial support, as well as the launch of precision missiles (“alpha” missions) and bombardment missions (“beta” missions). Regarding the “alpha” mission, the 12th Criminal Court noted that the regulations established that they “are used as a weapon against specific objectives [and] despite being a weapon of great precision, their use is not appropriate in populated areas.” As for “beta” missions, the norms indicated that they “should not be carried out in villages or areas where there is a civilian population.”327 Likewise, Permanent Directive NR 300–05 (1996) established that the “Air Force officer who commands the mission of aero-tactical support may suspend it if he realizes that the mission may cause damage to the civilian population or that the objective is located in a populated area."328 Lastly, the same document, NR 16854/CGFM - EMCD3 - PO - 375 of August 8, 1998, 321 For example, the report of the Apiay test indicates that there were distances of up to 54 meters between the impact points of two AN-M41A1 bombs from the same device. Ballistics Report No. 128288 of September 3, 2003, Prosecutor General’s Office, Job number BF 1241/2003 Procedure 419 (evidence file, tome 40, 21286). 322 Ballistics Report No. 128288 of September 3, 2003, Prosecutor General’s Office, Job number BF 1241/2003 Procedure 419 (evidence file, tome 40, folio 21267). 323 Cf. Superior Court of Bogotá, Criminal Chamber, Judgment of June 15, 2011 (evidence file, tome 20, folio 10806). 324 In this regard, as he himself indicated in the domestic criminal proceedings, “[…] the place where I sit in the back of the aircraft prevents me from having visibility towards the front [owing to] the position I am in.” Cf. Superior Court of Bogotá, Criminal Chamber, Judgment of June 15, 2011 (evidence file, tome 20, folio 10807). 325 Cf. 12th Criminal Court of the Trial Circuit of Bogotá D.C. with functions under Law 600 of 2000, First Instance Judgment, Case file 2005-102, September 24, 2009 (evidence file, tome 12, folios 6387 and 6388). 326 In this regard, the 12th Criminal Court of the Trial Circuit of Bogotá cited Permanent Directive NR 300–05 of 1996 entitled “General rules for airborne support to operations against domestic drug-trafficking and counterinsurgency,” Directive 057 of July 23, 1997, No. 10 of the General Coordination Instructions; the document NR 16854/CGFM-EMCD3-PO375 of August 8, 1998, signed by the General Commander of the Military Forces, and Permanent Directive 300-45 of September 3, 1998, concerning "General rules for airborne support to the Military Forces.” 12th Criminal Court of the Bogotá Trial Circuit with functions under Law 600 of 2000, First Instance Judgment, Case file 2005-102, September 24, 2009 (evidence file, tome 12, folios 6385 and 6386). 327 Directive 057 of July 23, 1997, No. 10 of the General Coordination Instructions, cited in 12th Criminal Court of the Trial Circuit of Bogotá D.C. with functions under Law 600 of 2000, First Instance Judgment, Case file 2005-102, September 24, 2009 (evidence file, tome 12, folio 6386). 328 Permanent Directive NR 300–05 of 1996 entitled “General rules for airborne support to operations against domestic drug-trafficking and counterinsurgency,” cited in 12th Criminal Court of the Trial Circuit of Bogotá D.C. with functions under Law 600 of 2000, First Instance Judgment, Case file 2005-102, September 24, 2009 (evidence file, tome 12, folio 6385). ‐ 66 ‐