State authorities a possible danger, nor did they request measures of protection.” It further argued that “during the last ten years, surveillance has been reinforced in this border area of the State of Zulia, and a Strategic Command has been established consisting of five Theaters of Operations, and about one hundred border protection posts”50, in order to provide protection and security to the population. 107. The State also pointed out that the case of Joe Castillo is not an extrajudicial execution and that the Commission incorrectly considered proven the involvement of State agents, based on statements by Edgar Alfonso González and Emer Humberto Terán (supra paras. 59 and 60), as well as press reports, which “cannot, ipso facto, be taken as true facts, as the Commission did.” In this regard, it argued that such unproven evidence cannot be used to accuse the State of direct responsibility. Likewise, the State considered that from the investigations carried out, it was not possible to find elements to prove the involvement of State agents through acts of acquiescence, collaboration or connivance. It further considered that it does not have the obligation to prove or disprove negative facts, since it is not possible to prove a fact that has not actually taken place. Therefore, it argued that the State did not commit omissions in the investigation and rejected the findings of the Commission, due to lack of evidence and to failings in its analysis conducted to determine the Venezuelan State’s responsibility for the violation of the right to life, personal integrity and the rights of the child. Considerations of the Court 108. Based on the foregoing, and in order to determine whether the murder of Joe Luis Castillo González and the injuries caused to Mrs. Yelitze Moreno and to the child Luis César Castillo Moreno can be attributed to the State and, therefore, imply its international responsibility, the Court will first examine the arguments regarding the possible acquiescence or tolerance of the State, and will subsequently consider the scope of the duty of prevention in this case. A. Alleged attribution of State responsibility due to acquiescence, tolerance or involvement of State agents 109. The Commission pointed out that “there were indications of links between the local mayor’s office and paramilitary groups which, in turn, were reputedly in possession of a list on which Joe Luis Castillo Gonzalez appeared as a target for elimination [; along with] an alleged link between those groups and National Guard intelligence units [, and] there were 50 In that regard, it specified in its answer brief that “[t]he Theater of Operations No. 1, (TO1) covers the border municipalities in the State Zulia and Táchira”. In addition, according to the evidence submitted to the Court, on December 13, 2011 the Commander Henry de Jesús Rangel Silva informed the State Agent, Mr. Germán Saltrón Negretti, that “since 1999 the National Bolivarian Armed Forces and other Security Organs of the State, […] have contributed to the constant and permanent operations to combat drug-trafficking, killings, theft, extortion, kidnapping and different crimes committed on the Colombian-Venezuelan border, and most especially, in the border State of Zulia, in the town of Machiques.” In that regard, he indicated that in order to “counteract the different scourges that afflict the local residents and displaced Colombian populations,” different operations have been carried out, such as “Operation Sierra, Operation Sentinel, Operation Boquete, Dibise and [P]lan Escudo to reinforce Operation Sentinel, among others […]”. As regards these measures, it explained that “in the States, and particularly in the border areas, operations have been carried out to safeguard rural and border security and for immigration control: search of vehicles and boats, inspection of border markers, eradication of illegal crops and seizure of drugs and narcotics, recovery of livestock, capture of alleged guerrillas and paramilitaries and persons involved in extortion, kidnapping and other crimes.” Cf. Official letter AGEV/000574, supra. For their part, the representatives stated that the militarization of the area occurred between 1994 and 1999, and that the “theaters of operations” established during that period continued operating afterwards. 26