that “following a proceeding that guaranteed the equality and participation of the parties,” “it was possible […] to capture and punish the perpetrators of the facts that resulted in the disappearance and murder of Mr. […] Palma Mendoza.” Accordingly, it indicated that “the proceeding itself was the crucial instrument that provided the presumed victim and his next of kin with guarantees to protect their rights and, consequently, mechanisms of reparation and punishment of those responsible for the crime perpetrated against Mr. […] Palma Mendoza.” 74. In addition, the State argued the existence of effective criminal proceedings in the course of which different measures were taken in order to reach a procedural truth. In this regard, it indicated that: It is worth asking ourselves whether the fact that, in the course of the proceedings, all those investigated are not convicted can result in lack of probity of the judges, or determine that the investigative procedure was a mere formality, which appears to be the argument put forward by the Commission in its report and also by the representative of the presumed victims. […] Hence, if proceedings were held that culminated in the corresponding punishment, respecting all the legal appeals, there is no reason or possibility for having recourse to an international court based on disagreement with the judgment that was handed down. 75. The State added that the task of “determin[ing whether’] there were masterminds and […] accessories after the fact” “is a task reserved to a domestic judge.” Also, that “Mr. Palma Mendoza’s next of kin discontinued their action,” and that this “reveals a certain juridical incoherence in taking the case to the regional system for the protection of human rights, without any grounds.” Also, it indicated that the discontinuance of the action “should not be understood as a secondary element, because it reveals the confidence of Mr. Palma Mendoza’s next of kin in the domestic legal system, which it considered capable of sentencing and convicting those they believed to be responsible for the crime perpetrated.” In addition, it indicated that, owing to the discontinuance, “it would make no sense that […] compensation is granted to those who waived the exercise of their rights [under] the criminal system and, in addition, under the civil proceedings, renounced compensation for damage against the perpetrators, in a preliminary proceeding.” 76. Moreover, the State argued “the inexistence of [the participation of] State agents in this case.” In this regard, it was emphatic in indicating that “unscrupulous individuals who falsified their identities or used false credentials to pretend that they were members of the Armed Forces, acted autonomously as private agents […] violating the criminal laws in force at the time.” 77. Regarding the duration of the domestic proceedings, the State indicated that the “complexity of the matter […] both factually and legally” should be considered, based on factors such as “the inter-relationship between judicial institutions to investigate and hear the case, the type and number of legal measures taken,” and “the number, status and location of the individuals involved in the proceedings, whether defendants or witnesses.” It added that, since this was a case that “went through three proceedings, in which a reconstruction of the crime was organized, [and …] numerous statements [, and also] grueling interviews took place and, evidently, information was disseminated throughout the country; definitely, the matter was complex.” 78. Regarding the application for habeas corpus, the State indicated that “the effective, simple and prompt remedy was indeed […] habeas corpus together with the application for habeas data,” and that the latter was not attempted, even though it was the “complementary [remedy] when trying to find persons who had presumably disappeared.” The State indicated that “even though [the application for habeas corpus] was initially 26