62 committed unlawful acts, and pursuant to International Law can not be granted amnesty, as this would be contrary to the standards of minimum protection to the dignity of the human person.238 [T]he issuance of amnesty laws is of the judicial-constitutional competence of the Congress of the Republic, in such a way that the judicial rulings which are issued pursuant to constitutionally legitimate amnesty laws lead to the configuration of the constitutional res judicata. The control of the amnesty laws, however, part of the presumption that the criminal legislature intended to carry out within the scope of the Constitution and respect for fundamental rights.239 [Said assumption] does not operate when it is proven that during the exercise of the competence to enact amnesty laws, the criminal legislator intended to also cover up the commission of crimes against humanity. Nor when the exercise of said competence was used to “guarantee” impunity for serious violations of human rights.240 On the merits[,] the Tribunal considers that amnesty laws [in question] are null and void and lack, ab initio, legal effect. Therefore, the orders enacted so as to guarantee impunity of the violation of human rights by [state agents] are also null and void.241 167. In the same sense, the Supreme Court of Justice of Uruguay ruled recently on the Expiry Law of the Punitive Claim of the State in said country, considering that: [no one] denies that a law enacted by a special majority and in extraordinary cases, the State may decide to waive punishment for criminal facts. [However, the law is unconstitutional because, in the case, the Legislative Power exceeded the constitutional scope for awarding amnesties242 [because] to declare the expiration of criminal prosecutions, in any case, exceeds the powers of the legislators and invades the forum of a function constitutionally assigned to judges, so that, for whatever reason, the legislature could not be attributed with the power of deciding that the period had expired regarding prosecution for certain crimes.243 [C]urrent regulation of human rights is not based on the position of sovereign States, but in the person as holder, given his or her status as such, of essential rights that can not be ignored based on the exercise of the constituent power, neither original nor derivative. 244 In this framework, [the amnesty law] under consideration affected the rights of many people (notably, the victims, the next of kin, or those harmed by the human rights violations mentioned above), their right to a remedy, an impartial and exhaustive investigation to ascertain the facts, to identify those responsible and to impose the 238 Constitutional Court of Peru, Case of Santiago Martín Rivas, Constitutional Tort Action, Case file No. 679-2005-PA/TC, Judgment of March 2, 2007, para. 30. 239 Constitutional Court of Peru, Case of Santiago Martín Rivas, Constitutional Tort Action, supra note 238, para. 52. 240 Constitutional Court of Peru, Case of Santiago Martín Rivas, Constitutional Tort Action, supra note 238, para. 53. 241 Constitutional Court of Peru, Case of Santiago Martín Rivas, Constitutional Tort Action, supra note 238, para. 60. 242 Supreme Court of Justice of Uruguay, Case of de Nibia Sabalsagaray Curutchet, Judgment No. 365/09, order of October 19, 2009, Considering clause III.2, paras. 8 and 9. 243 Supreme Court of Justice of Uruguay, Case of de Nibia Sabalsagaray Curutchet, supra note 242, Considering clause III.2, para. 13. 244 Supreme Court of Justice of Uruguay, Case of de Nibia Sabalsagaray Curutchet, supra note 242, Considering clause III.8, para. 6.