17 regard, the Court reiterates that the interpretation it has used for over 20 years of Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention is in conformity with International Law39 and that, pursuant to its jurisprudence40 and international jurisprudence,41 it is not the responsibility of the Court nor of the Commission to identify, ex officio, which domestic remedies need to be exhausted, but rather it is the State which should indicate in a timely manner the domestic remedies that must be exhausted and of their effectiveness. 39. The Tribunal notes that, in the case file before the Inter-American Commission, the latter requested the State to indicate, pursuant to Article 34 of its Court Rules of Procedure then in force, the legal elements which would allow to verify whether the remedies within the domestic jurisdiction had been exhausted. In response to this request, Brazil indicated that: a) the Ordinary Action which was still in the stage of hearing the case had not been exhausted, b) the possibility remained for the next of kin to file a habeas data petition and to obtain documents and information. These are the only positions held by the State in relation with the preliminary objection that were presented at the appropriate time. 40. To the contrary, the arguments regarding the Non-compliance Action No. 153, the Public Civil Suit, the possibility of filing a subsidiary criminal action, and the various initiatives regarding reparations, were presented by Brazil for the first time as a preliminary objection for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in the response to the application, approximately nine years and eight months after the Inter-American Commission’s decision on admissibility was adopted, thereby, time-barred. As such, said arguments cannot be admitted. 41. Regarding the two arguments of non-exhaustion of remedies presented at the appropriate time (supra para. 39), the Court notes that the State did not argue in the procedure before the latter the failure of not filing a habeas data, and as such, the Court considers that there was not an intention to proceed in this regard and will not make additional considerations. 42. Based on the aforementioned, the Court will only analyze the arguments of the State that refer to the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies regarding the Ordinary Action. At the time the Commission issued its Report No. 33/01, on March 6, 2001, 19 years after the action commenced, there was not a final decision on the merits in the domestic forum. Therefore, the Commission concluded that the delay in the proceeding could not be considered as reasonable. As a consequence, the Commission found that it could not require the exhaustion of domestic remedies and applied Article 46(2)(c) of the Convention 38 Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of July 2, 2004. Series C No. 107, para. 81; Case of Apitz-Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, para. 24, and Case of Bayarri, supra note 33, para. 16. 39 Cf. Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of June 30, 2009. Series C No. 197, para. 22, and Case of Usón Ramírez, supra note 37, para. 22. 40 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez. Preliminary Objections, supra note 37, para. 88; Case of Reverón Trujillo, supra note 39, para. 23, and Case of Usón Ramírez, supra note 37, para. 22. 41 Cf. E.C.H.R., Deweer v. Belgium, Application No. 6903/75, Judgment of 27 February 1980, para. 26; E.C.H.R., Foti and others v. Italy, Applications Nos. 7604/76, 7719/76, 7781/77, and 7913/77, Judgment of 10 December 1982, para. 48, and E.C.H.R., De Jong, Baljet and van den Brink v. the Netherlands, Applications Nos. 8805/79, 8806/79, and 9242/81, Judgment of 22 May 1984, para. 36.