B.1.2 Preventive detention 73. Now, the same proceedings that ordered the apprehension of Mr. Carranza also ordered his “preventive detention” on the basis of Article 177 of the CCP. The Court infers the above because there is no record of proceedings—after the orders of the superintendent and the 11th Court of August and October 1993 (supra paras. 36 and 38)—that confirmed or made a decision regarding deprivation of liberty after the initial detention. 74. It follows from the above that Article 7(2) of the Convention was the legal basis for the preventive detention; whether other measures were taken in accordance with the Convention remains to be examined. 75. Article 7(3) of the Convention indicates that for a deprivation of liberty to not become arbitrary, the following requirements must be met: i) there must be evidence to develop charges or go to trial—evidence that is sufficient to reasonably suppose that an illicit act took place and that the person on trial could have participated in it; 44 ii) the goal must be compatible with the Convention, 45 namely: to keep the defendant from obstructing the conduct of the trial and from evading justice, 46 and the measures must be appropriate, necessary, and strictly proportional to that goal; 47 and iii) the ruling that imposes the measures must have sufficient motivation to allow for an evaluation of whether it meets the conditions described. 48 Any restriction on liberty that does not have 44 This must not in itself constitute an element capable of weakening the principle of the presumption of innocence contained in Article 8(2) of the Convention. To the contrary, it is in addition to the other requirements. This decision must have no effect on the judge’s ruling regarding the defendant’s culpability. Suspicion must be based on specific facts described in words, not on mere conjecture or abstract intuition. It follows from this that the State must not detain people to investigate them later. Rather, deprivation of liberty is only authorized when there is enough information to bring the person to trial (cf. Case of Servellón García et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 21, 2006. Series C No. 152, para. 90, and Case of Jenkins v. Argentina, para. 75). 45 Cf. Case of Servellón García et al. v. Honduras, para. 90, and Case of Jenkins v. Argentina, para. 74. Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 20, 1999. Series C No. 44, para. 77, and Case of Jenkins v. Argentina, para. 76. The need for these purposes is based on Articles 7(3), 7(5), and 8(2) of the Convention (cf. Case of Romero Feris v. Argentina, para. 99). 46 Cf. Case of Tibi v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 7, 2004. Series C No. 114, para. 106; Case of Argüelles et al. v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2014. Series C No. 288, para. 120, and Case of Jenkins v. Argentina, para. 76. The indicated criteria that must be met for a deprivation of liberty signify the following: i) appropriate: the measure is suitable for reaching the intended goal; ii) necessary: the measure is absolutely indispensable for attaining the desired goal, and there is no measure that is less severe—with respect to the affected right—out of all the measures that are equally appropriate for reaching the proposed goal; and iii) strictly proportional: the sacrifice inherent in restricting the right to liberty is not excessive compared to the advantages obtained through that restriction and the attainment of the intended goal (cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, para. 92, and Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica, para. 356, and Case of Romero Feris v. Argentina, para. 98. 47 48 Cf. Case of García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2005. Series C No. 137, para. 128, and Case of Jenkins v. Argentina, para. 74. The requirement for motivation is related to judicial guarantees (Article 8(1) of the Convention). In addition, so that the presumption of innocence (Article 8(2)) is respected when precautionary measures restricting liberty are ordered, the State must prove, in a clear and well-motivated way, with reference to each particular case, that the above-mentioned criteria required by the Convention are met (cf. Case of García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru, para. 128; Case of J. v. Peru, para. 159, and Case of Jenkins v. Argentina, para. 77). 18